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ABSTRACT
Managing information security has increasingly become more important as
information security breaches, computer fraud, and other devastating events are
increasingly more frequent and disrupting business processes. Information is one of the
most important enterprise assets. Therefore, information is valuable and should be
properly protected. Accounting employees are tasked with specific responsibilities of
information risk management. Therefore, ineffectively managing accountants may result
in countless problems for the company, not the least of which are reputational problems,
loss of stock value, material financial reporting errors, and financial losses. In Essay 1, I
examine the elements of the fraud triangle and the impact to specific information security
policy violations of copying sensitive financial information. In Essay 2, I find the
unexpected effects of implementing higher demands on accountants. In Essay 3, I explore
a deeper dimension of the accountant’s internal justification when considering a violation
in information security policies. This dissertation considers the challenges of managing
the human aspect especially the role of accountants in information security. Security
techniques and management tools have caught the attention from both academia and
practitioners. This dissertation examines the fraud triangle as a theoretical framework for
information security risk management among accountants. In the three essays’, I attempt
to integrate security policy theory, management system theory, the fraud triangle, and
moral disengagement theory to provide a deeper understanding of information security
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management. The findings carry implications for not only for future research on security
violation behaviors, but also for continuation of broadening the theoretical foundation of
the fraud triangle for further empirical research and application.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Organizations’ heavy reliance on information systems (IS) requires them to
manage the risks associated with those systems. Although the United States’ SarbanesOxley Act (SOX) of 2002 serves to improve corporate responsibility and internal
controls, the financial reporting processes are driven through IS. Specific sections of the
SOX (i.e., Section 404, 409,802) give a broad overview of the necessary IS controls to
reach rigorous and secure internal controls regarding an organization’s IS. In order to
properly enhance an organization’s security management, many organizations have
chosen to use a security framework (i.e., COSO, COBIT, ISO177799). In order to
comply with the security framework guidelines organizations are required to create
information security policies (ISPs). These ISPs specify the standards, limitations, and
responsibilities employees have in order to assist with the deterrence, detection, and
response to IS security-related incidents (Bulgurcu et al. 2010).
Despite information security management’s efforts, there continues to be an
abundance of intentional ISP violations. Employee intentional ISP violations may vary
from data entry, failing to log off work computers, sharing passwords, delaying backups,
to using unsecured USB’s (Guo 2013; Johnston et al. 2016). The malicious and
intentional computer abuse ranges from deliberate insider sabotage to committing
computer fraud (Willison and Warkentin 2013).
1
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The risks associated with ISP violations are a significant challenge for many
organizations, since these risks may warrant unwanted consequences; including corporate
liability, reputational damages, and monetary loss (Berezina et al. 2012; Campbell et al.
2003).
From the theoretical perspective, the perspectives of employees in a position of
trust within an organization have become a focal point of research. Previous research has
shown that employees are often the weakest link in information security (Bulgurcu et al.
2010; Martins and Elofe 2002). Organizations create ISPs to provide guidelines to
employees to ensure information security; however, these ISPs alone are not enough to
prevent ISP violations. Unfortunately, limited attention has been paid to explain this
phenomenon in accounting literature. Therefore, this dissertation will lay the foundation
to understanding the motivations and reasoning behind accounting employees and their
intentional information security policy (ISP) violations.

Theoretical Background
In my research, I apply the fraud triangle from the accounting literature and apply
this as a basis of this dissertation (Cressey 1953; Dorminey et al. 2012). The fraud
triangle implies interrelationships between three fraud risk categories called opportunity,
rationalization, and pressure. The fraud triangle is the dominant framework in auditing
and forensic accounting and is entrenched in the formal ethical standards of professional
associations around the globe (Murphy and Free 2015). Each element of the fraud
triangle has given auditors a framework to follow when attempting to explain fraudulent
behavior. Each element of the fraud triangle has been conceptualized to explain
fraudulent behavior, which is known as illegal and malicious behavior. The opportunity
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for fraud is seldom purposefully provided to the employee; however, in the case of
perceived opportunity for an intentional, but not malicious ISP violation, it will be
commonly presented (i.e. copying data to bring home to complete work). Therefore, the
perception of opportunity may not play as critical a role in intentional ISP violation
behavior. The rationalization for malicious fraudulent behavior is expected to be more
important than the rationalization for intentional but non-malicious ISP violations.
Usually, the ethics of the employees will prevent them from violating the organization’s
ISP, as suggested in the existing literature (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Chia and Lim 2000;
Goles et al. 2006). The pressure for fraudulent behavior mainly refers to the pressure
from a non-shareable financial problem (Dorminey et al., 2012), but in the context of
intentional but non-malicious ISP violating behavior, a non-shareable financial problem
is not expected to be the primary source of pressure. Instead, ISP controls are expected to
become the source of pressure for the violation behavior. Therefore, in this dissertation, I
explore the pressure element of the fraud triangle as the most critical trait to explain the
effect ISP controls have on accountant’s ISP violating intention.
The term ISP pressure in this dissertation describes the stressful demands
specifically imposed by security requirements. The pressure to commit a violation
intention can be caused by internal or external security-related demands (D'Arcy et al.
2014; Fogarty et al. 2000). Stress experienced in information technology is a
multidimensional concept (Ragu-Nathan et al. 2008). Stress is defined in terms of
stimulating conditions that produce reactions such as declining physical and mental
health (Lazarus and Folkman 1984). The conditions reflect employees’ struggles to deal
with workplace technologies and depletion of cognitive resources related to their use.
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Drawing upon information security literature, I use the construct of security-related stress
(SRS) to define ISP pressure. SRS considers the overload, complexity, and uncertain
dimensions of stress (D'Arcy et al. 2014; Tarafdar et al. 2010). In the context of my
study, ISP overload describes situations where ISP requirements increase the workload
for employees. Research indicates that employees view these ISPs to hinder their work
productivity (Posey et al. 2011b; Stanton and Stam 2006). This overload in work duties
can enhance the perception of ISP pressure employees feel when choosing to violate
ISPs. For example, when employees perceive the ISP requirements to be timeconsuming or inconvenient, they look for ways to complete their assigned work even if
that means stepping outside of the ISP boundaries.
ISP complexity describes situations when ISP requirements are regarded as too
complicated. Employees are forced to expend extra time and effort to learn and
understand the ISPs. For example, the ISPs may involve overly complicated technical
jargon, and employees must devote more time to understand the language (Puhakainen
and Siponen 2010). These extra burdens to comply can be frustrating for employees.
ISP uncertainty refers to organizations continuously changing their job-related
security requirements. Organizations have faced a sudden increase in information
security requirements in recent years (Clayton 2017; Haried et al. 2019). This uncertainty
can be disconcerting for employees and cause pressure for employees which causes them
to choose to violate ISPs intentionally. Thus, in my dissertation, I further expand on the
notion of how employees will react when ISP pressure levels are high.
Management control over the processes, activities, and behaviors of employees is
an integral part of any organization. Management controls include devices and systems
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managers use to guarantee that the behaviors of their employees are consistent with an
organization’s objectives (Malmi and Brown 2008). Accounting controls will include
types of governance controls that monitor budget forecasts and performance measures
(Fiolleau et al. 2018). These management controls enhance effective organizational
operations, yet there is a growing body of accounting research that suggests formal
controls can negatively affect the behaviors of employees subjected to these controls
(Christ et al. 2008). Therefore, in this study, I assume an organization’s formal ISPs as a
type of mandatory control system. When policies are implemented into an organization,
organizations assume employees will comply with the new changes (Chae and Poole
2005; Malhotra and Galletta 2005). However, prior research has used reactance theory as
a theoretical lens to explain why high levels of ISP controls backfire and increase
unwanted employee behavior (Lowry and Moody 2015). Therefore, I explore further this
notion of why management controls on employees may not achieve the expected
outcomes.
An employee’s perception of truth and fairness depends on how he views the
standards of true or false and fair or unfair. Information systems within organizations can
reinforce or dissolve the perception of fairness. There is substantial evidence that
employees’ perceptions of fairness will play an imperative role when making businessrelated decisions (Colquitt et al. 2003). Individual perceptions of organizational justice
can influence co-workers, superiors, and compliance towards policies of the organization
(Colquitt et al. 2001; Leventhal et al. 1980; Li et al. 2014; Willison et al. 2018). I argue in
this study that organizations need to examine perceptions of fairness within an
organization as a possible motivator to unwanted ISP violations.
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Organizational justice is manifested in four specific ways: interactional,
informational, distributive, and procedural (Colquitt et al. 2001; Greenberg 1987).
Interactional justice is the perceived fairness of how employees receive the explanation of
formal procedures (Bies and Shapiro 1987). In other words, interactional justice reflects
employees’ feelings of how fairly managers treat them. Informational justice refers to
fairness in the communication process of formal company procedures (Colquitt et al.
2001). For example, an employee’s perception of the sincerity of communication would
determine the level of informational justice. Distributive justice refers to the perceived
fairness of outcomes (Colquitt et al. 2003). Procedural justice is the perceived fairness of
the process (e.g., policies and procedures, and their enactments) of determining outcomes
or resource distributions (Colquitt et al. 2001). In this study, formal procedure refers to a
company’s rules, regulations, or policies (i.e., ISPs) that precisely guide an organization’s
information security management.
The perception of fairness of authorities and co-workers is an essential factor
when examining employee behavior (Alge 2001; Willison et al. 2018; Zhang 2008). In
the context of information security, I also examine how employees may rationalize
corporate misconduct when they feel they are not being treated fairly (Colquitt et al.
2012; Li et al. 2014; Posey et al. 2011a; Willison et al. 2018).

Research Focus of the Three Essays
With the need for effective information security management, my dissertation
examines practical scenarios organizations often encounter.
In Essay 1 the first goal is to examine whether the three elements of the fraud
triangle exposed to an individual will be equally important (i.e. work pressure plays a
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more significant role than the other two points of the triangle when examining the intent
to copy company data to complete their work at home). The second goal of the study is to
assess whether work completion justification will enhance the resolve of employees to
copy company data to complete their work at home.
Essay 2 focuses on how organizational ISP controls influence accountant’s ISP
violating intention via the fraud triangle elements. I also aim to understand whether or not
an employee’s ISP self-efficacy will relieve part of the ISP stress accounting employees
may encounter. As regulations and guidelines for ISP implementation continue to rapidly
change, the essay examines the perception of work uncertainty to give further
understanding of how the climate within an organization can motivate accounting
employees to intentionally violate ISPs.
Essay 3 explores the ISP pressure further by attempting to understand the
rationalization an accounting employee may do when considering an intentional ISP
violation decision. As accounting employees justify their choices, they may consider
other external factors. I examine the organizational justice to understand the influence of
the perceptions of justice when accounting employees conduct this rationalizing.
Drawing on the fraud triangle theory (Cressey 1953) as the overarching theory, I
postulate that an accounting employee’s intentional ISP violation behavior will be
influenced by a perception of opportunity, work pressure, specific security-related
pressure, and rationalization of their misconduct. Building on the fraud triangle theory, I
propose antecedents such as the organizational controls, ISP self-efficacy, and
examination of the environment for levels of uncertainty may influence an accounting
employee’s violation behavior. I also investigate the role of justice within an organization
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and hypothesize that it influences an accounting employee’s rationalization as well as
their intention to violate ISPs.
In Chapter 2, I propose Essay 1. Essay 1 examines the specific phenomena of
intentional ISP violations through a specific scenario of copying company data to
complete their assigned work. In order to avoid a possible threat of unwanted data
leakage, specific ISPs may prohibit employees from copying and removing company data
from the work environment. However, as employees with accounting, financial, or IT
responsibilities continue to be given a bigger work load, it has become challenging for
them to finish their assigned work during traditional working hours.
Essay 1 uses the fraud triangle theoretical lenses to examine this data copying
behavior. The fraud triangle theory emphasizes the motives of individuals as the most
critical points of the triangle and opportunity and rationalization at the other points. Since
this type of ISP violation has no malicious financial gain to the individual, the stress
experienced by employees will be from the general pressures of their work. Opportunity
means there are possibilities for the employees to be able to copy company data to
complete their work. The rationalization point in Essay 1 is constructed as an employee’s
level of personal technological idealism. This motivation will be the driving need for
employees to complete their work. Work completion justification is hypothesized to
enhance an employee’s intentional ISP violation behavior.
In Chapter 3, I propose Essay 2. Essay 2 examines the roots of the three corners of
the fraud triangle to further understand why accounting employees continue to display
intentional ISP violation behaviors. The creation of the ISPs is to facilitate, prevent, and
detect security incidents. Therefore, the first step to examine why intentional ISP
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violations are still occurring, I look at how accounting employees perceive their
organizations level of ISP control. Since accounting literature has thoroughly examined
how accounting employees experience high levels of stress, I research some of the
possible contributing factors to their ISP stress such as ISP self-efficacy and the
organization’s level of work uncertainty. In order to match the proper stress to ISP
violation behavior, Essay 2 examines the specific ISP stress accountants may encounter
(D'Arcy et al. 2014). These specific security strains are comprised of ISP uncertainty, ISP
overload, and ISP complexity. Essay 2 stretches the boundaries of the fraud triangle to
investigate causes and extends its application to ISP violations beyond the normal
fraudulent behavior.
In Chapter 4, I propose Essay 3. Essay 3 further expands the understanding of the
rationalization corner of the fraud triangle. The rationalization an individual does is a
challenging matter to understand. Therefore, in Essay 3, the moral disengagement theory
provides specific levels of rationalization an individual may encounter when accountants
intentionally violate ISPs—specifically capturing how accountants may excuse their
responsibility to ISPs (Bandura 1999). Since I attempt to explain an accountant’s internal
rationalization process for violating ISPs, it is essential to also examine external
environmental factors that may cause an accountant to rationally ignore their information
security responsibility. The organizational justice theory helps provide a holistic
representation of how the perception of fairness within an organization will drive the
intentional ISP violation behavior to be less or more (Colquitt et al. 2003).
All three essays utilize the survey method to test the research model. The initial
survey instrument was developed by first identifying and creating appropriate measures
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based on a comprehensive literature review. Data was then collected by administrating
the final survey instrument online.
The present chapter introduces the concepts of the fraud triangle and provides a
brief review of management controls and organizational justice. Each essay will present a
conceptual research model consisting of potential mediators and moderators in addition
to the direct effects of the fraud triangle for intentional ISP violations. This dissertation is
organized as follows: each chapter will present a brief review of the relevant literature,
highlight the unique contributions of my work, a research model, development of
hypotheses to be tested, followed by a summary of the research method, and a description
of the data analysis and presentation of the results. Finally, each study will discuss the
findings, implications, and future research directions.

CHAPTER 2

ESSAY 1: USING THE FRAUD TRIANGLE TO EXPLORE
MOTIVATIONS FOR EMPLOYEES’ COPYING
COMPANY DATA
Introduction
Copying company data, such as personal sensitive employee details, e-mail,
corporate documents, third-party sensitive data, company directories, and business
calendars, to Portable Storage Devices (PSD, including USB drives, PDAs and
smartphones) has become increasingly common in organizations. Consequently,
organizations have raised concerns being raised on the potential of data leakage (Gorge
2005). To avoid this threat of unwanted data leakage, organizations often develop
specific information security policies (ISP) to prohibit employees from copying company
data and bringing company data home to avoid related information security problems
(Tetmeyer and Saiedian 2010). For example, ISPs may prohibit portable media devices
such as unsecured USB drives to be brought into the organization. (Conner and Coviello
2004; Gorge 2005; Lee et al. 2009). However, as employees become increasingly
overwhelmed by their workload, it has become more challenging for them to finish their
work during traditional working hours. Due to the pressure to complete their work,
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employees are forced to copy company data in order to continue work at home. Thus,
there exists an irreconcilable conflict between ISP compliance and timely work
completion. Even when specific ISP policies have been created to address this violation,
there are still employees who choose to violate these policies (Guo et al. 2011; Siponen
and Vance 2010). This study explores the motivation for this unique intentional violation
behavior (i.e., copying company data to bring home).
Previous research has examined several different theoretical lenses to explain the
employees’ ISP intentional violating behavior in the information system security
literature. One such theory known as deterrence theory has been applied to investigate the
effects of organizational deterrent measures on employee computer misuse (D'Arcy et al.
2009; Herath and Rao 2009; Hu et al. 2011). Another significant theory utilizes a code of
ethics to clarify responsibility to deter unethical behavior (Harrington 1996; Myyry et al.
2009). Yet another, unified model of ISP compliance considers fear, moral beliefs, social
factors, and deterrents to predict intention to comply with information security policies
(Moody et al. 2018). Although these different theories have provided essential insights on
the general intentional violating behavior, researchers have called on the antecedents
exploration by focusing on specific violating behavior because it can provide more finegrained insights and more actionable implications for the practices (Johnston et al. 2019;
Moody et al. 2018; Vance et al. 2019). For example, copying company data behavior in
this study further distinguishes the purpose of examining general intentional ISP violating
behavior. If the employees copy data for a financial benefit (i.e. insider trading, leaking
sensitive information), then this violating behavior is not only intentional but is also
malicious (Harrington 1996; Posey et al. 2011a; Willison and Warkentin 2013; Willison
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et al. 2018). In stark contrast to copying data for financial gain, when employees violate
the ISP and copy company data for the purpose of working at home, the violating
behavior may be intentional, but is not malicious (D'Arcy et al. 2014). When comparing
these two types of data copying behavior, I find there are different motivations for their
violating behavior. In this study, I focus on the motivation exploration for intentional but
not malicious behavior consistent with copying company data in order to complete their
work.
Interestingly, D'Arcy et al. (2014) considers ISP demands as one unique pressure
to result in the employee’s ISP violating behavior; unfortunately, there is a lack of
knowledge in examining the effect of other types of pressure such as work pressure on
the violating intention, which I argue is the essential reason for the data copying
behavior.
In this study, I take the fraud triangle (Dorminey et al. 2012) from the accounting
literature and apply this as a foundation of my theoretical model, which implies but does
not formalize interrelationships between three fraud risk categories called opportunity,
rationalization and pressure. The fraud triangle is a dominant framework in auditing and
forensic accounting and it has become entrenched in the formal ethical standards of
professional associations around the globe (Murphy and Free 2015). The three perceived
elements of the fraud triangle are opportunity, rationalization, and pressure. Opportunity
is defined as engaging in fraudulent activity arise when employees perceive a control
weakness is present and that the ability to commit a fraudulent act without detection is
high while the likelihood of being caught is remote (Dorminey et al. 2012).
Rationalization occurs when individuals who commit fraud desire to do so without
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incurring negative self-perceptions, so they will typically seek to rationalize their
fraudulent actions to themselves (Dorminey et al. 2012). Pressure to commit fraudulent
behavior can be categorized as personal, employment, and external pressure (Albrecht
and Albrecht 1982). Prior research studies have found that when all three dimensions are
detected the higher the likelihood of fraudulent behavior will be present in an
organization (Dorminey et al. 2012; Dorminey et al. 2010; Ramamoorti 2008).
In this study, I extend the boundaries of the fraud triangle to provide one
theoretical perspective to understand the motivations for specific data copying behavior.
This theory emphasizes the motives, pressures, and needs of individuals at the most
critical corner of the triangle; opportunity and rationalization sit at the other two corners
(Wilks and Zimbelman 2004). The opportunity arises for computer fraud when there is an
absence of controls, ineffective controls, or the ability to override controls. In the context
of my study, no opportunity will be defined as no channel or interface for the employees
to copy company data. For example, the computer in an organization may be
programmed so that data can only be stored and accessed but not copied. Therefore,
opportunity will be the first antecedent of the data intentional data copying behavior.
Rationalization is an attitude to commit computer misuse. Rationalization happens when
individuals make a conscious decision to use technology to present fraudulent or
misrepresented information for a personal gain (i.e., asset misappropriations). In this
study, employees’ morality will use idealism as a proxy, and it will play a role in
rationalizing ISP compliance. The level of morality of the employees will prevent them
from violating the organization’s ISP, as suggested in the existing literature (Bulgurcu et
al. 2010; Chia and Lim 2000; Goles et al. 2006). Finally, general work pressure, as the
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third dimension, may give employees an incentive to commit fraud. General work
pressure will also be the crucial source of the conflict with ISP compliance. Therefore, I
argue it will be the third antecedent of the data copying behavior and the most critical
factor on whether employees will copy company data to bring home. With these three
factors, opportunity, rationalization and work pressure, I propose a violating triangle
model to explore the first goal of this study. I explore whether all the three elements of
the fraud triangle exposed to an individual will be equally important (i.e., work pressure
plays a more significant role than the other two points of the triangle in this context) to
predict the intention of copying company data to complete their work at home.
Research studies shows that people will justify their behavior before conducting
any action (Haines and Leonard 2007a; Haines and Leonard 2007b; Paradice and Dejoie
1991). Prior research points out that the main reason for non-compliance with security
policies is that ISPs conflict with work productivity (Kirlappos et al. 2013; Zimmermann
and Renaud 2019).
Therefore, I argue that work completion justification will influence the condition
for an individual’s justification for copying company data and bringing their work home.
Specifically, when stronger work completion justification is formed, work pressure will
increase employees’ intention to violate specific ISP policies. In contrast, when more
compelling work completion justification is formed, the goodness of employees
(idealism) on ISP violating intention will be reduced. Employees who finish their work in
their designated work hours reduce the mental stress that considering intentional ISP
causes. The opportunity of violating is not influenced by the work completion
justification to enhance the violating intention. Therefore, the second goal of this study is
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to explore whether work completion justification will enhance the possibilities of
employees’ copying company data intention.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, I present an outline of
the previous research on information security to present the theoretical model, the fraud
triangle to examine employees’ behavior of copying company data and to bring back
home and then I present the hypotheses. Subsequently, followed by the description of the
model discussion, data analysis using Partial Least Square (PLS) is discussed. In
conclusion, I will discuss the findings, contributions, implications, and limitations as well
as future directions for research.

Literature Review/Prior Research
Information system users in an organization have been considered as the weakest
link for organization information security (Spears and Barki 2010; Wang et al. 2015;
Warkentin and Willison 2009), especially with a wide variety of computer systems being
integrated into the business processes operation. As the complexity of information
systems grow, organizations risk having their systems compromised by both intentional
and unintentional acts of organization employees. To address these issues (Kelloway et
al. 2002) suggested that counterproductive behaviors (i.e. undesirable corporate conduct)
and organizational citizenship (i.e. complying with ISPs) behaviors are empirically
distinct. General management studies traditionally focus on general policies that govern
employee citizenship behavior in the workplace. Information security (IS) literature, on
the other hand, focuses on a specific set of policies—ISPs—that govern how employees
behave to deal with counterproductive security issues. More specifically, prior IS
research examine three main types of ISP violation acts caused by insiders. The first
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being unintentional acts of ISP violations, which have been described as employees who
perform their duties according to company policies and are not intentionally subverting
controls to engage in violation behaviors (Loch et al. 1992; Taylor 2006). The second
being classified as non-malicious intentional ISP security violations (Guo et al. 2011).
These non-malicious yet intentional ISP violations are conceptualized as not selfbenefitting actions and are done without malicious intent (Siponen and Vance 2010). The
third category of ISP violation is considered computer abuse which is defined as the
unauthorized and deliberate misuse of the local organizational information system by
individuals including violations against hardware, programs, data, and computer services
(Dhillon 1999; Straub Jr 1990). I present Table 2-1 to highlight the main differences
between the three main classifications of ISP violations caused by internal users.

Table 2-1
Comparison of Unintentional, Intentional (Non-Malicious), Intentional (Malicious)
Information Security Violations
Concepts
Unintentional
security
violations
Intentional,
nonmalicious
security
violations

Intentional,
malicious
computer
abuse

Key Differences
Unintentional, not
malicious, no financial
gain, no self-benefits
Intentional making
conscious decision to
violate, self- benefitting
without malicious intent,
voluntary rule breaking

Intentional, illegal,
unethical, malicious,
financial and personal
self-benefits

Examples
Accidental data entry,
accidental destruction of
data
Copy sensitive data to
USB drives, Password
sharing, Failure to logoff
computer, delaying
security patch updates
Copying data to bring
home to complete work
Revealing confidential
information to outsiders
that may harm
organization, writing
viruses, software piracy

References
(Loch et al.
1992; Taylor
2006)
(Guo et al.
2011; Siponen
and Vance
2010)
(Guo 2013;
Siponen and
Vance 2010)
(D'Arcy et al.
2009; Straub Jr
1990; Willison
and Warkentin
2013)
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Scholars view ISPs as guidelines– normative lists of actions that the employees
should (or should not) perform (Hevner et al. 2004; Siponen and Iivari 2006; Warman
1992). However, the design of ISPs faces the problem that such policies and guidelines
do not necessarily make it possible to address all situations reasonably. For example,
(Puhakainen and Ahonen 2006) observed that organizational ISPs strictly forbid taking
any information away from the company premises without formal permission from the IS
managers but, the employees of the company still took their laptops, USB sticks, and
CDs to their homes and to meetings outside of the company. According to a 2019 survey,
global information technology leaders found that one in three companies suffer from
these specific security-related issues with remote workers (Rowe 2019). Unfortunately,
no empirical study has exclusively examined this critical phenomenon to provide more
specific insights and more actionable implications on the practice (Johnston et al. 2019;
Moody et al. 2018; Vance et al. 2019).
Previous research has explored different theoretical lenses to explain the
employees’ ISP violating or compliance intention or behavior. First, deterrence theory is
one of the most widely applied theories in behavioral IS security studies (D'Arcy et al.
2009). Based on the rational choice view of human behavior, the theory predicts that
illicit behavior can be controlled by the threat of sanctions that are certain, severe, and
swift (D'arcy and Herath 2011). However, by emphasizing the difference between
malicious and non-malicious security violation (NMSV) behaviors, (Guo et al. 2011)
proposed one NMSV model based on the theory of reasoned action (TRA) and the theory
of planned behavior (TPB). They pointed out that deterrence theory may help explain
why users comply with computer use or security rules but not why they break these rules
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or engage in NMSVs. Their empirical result also shows no significant effect of sanction
on the NMSV behavior. Second, beyond the lens of deterrence theory, (Siponen and
Vance 2010) adopted a neutralization theory to provide a compelling explanation for IS
security policy violations and offer new insight into how employees rationalize this
behavior. This theory emphasizes that employees will rationalize their violations of
security policies by using several neutralization techniques such as the defense of
necessity. Also, when employees perceive stressful ISP requirements, this will result in
the justification for employee’s violation intention and behavior (D'Arcy et al. 2014).
Third, an ethical perspective, which refers to the ethical content of informal norms and
behavior, was frequently used to deal with those situations where no formal rules or
policies are in place (Chatterjee et al. 2015).
The underlying logic for ethical perspective in security-related behavior is that the
impact of the morality and ethical beliefs held by the individuals will influence their
attitude to the computer-related violating behavior and further reduce the violating
intention (Gattiker and Kelley 1999; Sojer et al. 2014). To some extent, morality and
ethical beliefs held by the individuals could be one tool of neutralization technique to
rationalize their compliance but not violating behavior. Fourth, criminal opportunity
theory was recently adopted as another critical lens to consider opportunity as the
explanation for employee behavior of unauthorized access attempts on information
systems applications in a financial institution (Wang et al. 2019). For example,
(Padayachee 2016) identified opportunity-reducing technologies as an effective
mechanism to mitigate insider threats.
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The literature review revealed that although prior studies have provided some
valuable insights on the conceptualization of security-related violating behaviors.
However, there are some limitations and gaps that warrant further investigations. In this
study, I specifically examine the antecedents that have not been examined for intentional
ISP violations (i.e. intentional copying company data). In the context of copying data to
continue work at home, employees may not consider their violation behavior as unethical
which poses doubts on the ethical perspectives on this violating behavior. Although the
stress of employees as a motivational factor for the rationalization for violating behavior
has been examined, discussion in the literature on the sources of stress is still limited to
the ISP itself, including burdensome, complex, and ambiguous information security
requirements.
Organizations continue to place mandatory compliance towards ISPs (Renaud
2011). However, this sometimes creates impossible standards that interfere with their
ability to work effectively. For the behavior of copying data from the organization in
order to continue work at home, to considering work stress in more depth is necessary
because the extent of work stress that employees are under may not only directly result in
employees’ stress, but also ISP stress in this context. The perception of opportunity
should also be integrated to explain the specific data copying behavior explored in this
study because the organization controls the possibility for the employees to copy data.
Previous research has proposed one general composite behavior model to understand the
NMSV in the workplace (Guo et al. 2011). In addition, IS behavioral research can
improve the practical relevance without loss of rigor by measuring specific examples of
ISP violations, that is, data copying in this study (Siponen and Vance 2014).
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Therefore, to adequately explain the data copying as one specific non-malicious
but intentional violating behavior, it is necessary to integrate different theoretical lenses
in the existing literature to propose one integrated but contextualized research model. As
discussed, this integrated model should include three components: moral or ethical beliefs
held by employees, work pressure as rationalization, and opportunity to copy data for use
at home which implies the theoretical lens of the fraud triangle.
Fraud Triangle Model
The fraud triangle literature has slowly multiplied over the last decade, and its
concepts have gradually been applied to a wide array of disciplines (Cressey 1954; Huber
et al. 2015; Lou and Wang 2009; Morales et al. 2014; Schuchter and Levi 2016).
Antifraud efforts have attracted the attention of professionals, including but not limited to
internal and external auditors, members of the board of directors, management, and
regulators. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners' (ACFE) 2018 Report to the
Nation estimates the cost of fraud to be over $7 billion in total fraud losses in annual
revenues (Examiners 2018). To understand why individuals, commit fraud, many
professionals refer to the fraud triangle. The significance of the fraud triangle in
understanding motivation and its importance is most evident in Statement on Auditing
Standards (SAS) 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. The fraud
triangle has enhanced professionals' ability to prevent, deter, detect, investigate, and
remediate fraud (Dorminey et al. 2010).
First, the management or other employees have an incentive or are
under pressure, which provides a reason to commit fraud. Second, circumstances exist—
for example, the absence of controls and/or ineffective controls creating a perception of
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opportunity. Perceived opportunity is the perception (1) that a control weakness is
present, and importantly, (2) that the likelihood of being caught is remote. Therefore,
perceived opportunity requires the ability to commit the act, and to do so without
detection (Hollinger and Clark 1983). Third, those involved can rationalize committing a
fraudulent act. Some individuals possess an attitude, character, or set of ethical values
that allow them to knowingly and intentionally commit a dishonest act. However, even
“honest” individuals can commit fraud in an environment that imposes sufficient pressure
on them. Rationalization is an attempt to reduce the cognitive dissonance within the
individual (Ramamoorti 2008; Ramamoorti et al. 2009). The higher the incentive or
pressure, the more likely an individual will be able to rationalize the acceptability of
committing fraud. (AICPA, 2002). Likewise, the greater the perceived opportunity or the
more intense the pressure, the less rationalization it takes to motivate someone to commit
fraud (Albrecht et al. 1984).
A representation of the “fraud triangle” theory is illustrated in Figure 2-1. This
model highlights the separation of the individual who perpetrates the crime from the
criminal act. As organizations continue to become technologically advanced, employees
continually rely on computers for their daily tasks. Thus, some research has shown that
individuals may engage use computers to engage in occupational fraud (Guragai et al.
2015). Since systems legitimize individual wrongdoing by allowing people to focus on
their duties within the system, the disassociation will enable employees to not overlook
the moral impact of their actions (Adams 1998).
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The three points of the fraud triangle capture the necessary antecedents to provide
a finer grained insight on the intentional but not malicious ISP violation such as copying
data from the organization to bring home in order to complete their work.

Figure 2-1: Three Points of the Fraud Triangle

Opportunity
When the term opportunity was initially introduced as a term into the
entrepreneurship literature, it was defined as an “alertness to changed conditions or to
overlooked possibilities” (Kirzner 1979). In this study, opportunities arise for violating
ISP’s when there is an absence of controls, ineffective controls, or the ability to override
controls. These opportunities can be noticed even by persons who are not actively
seeking them. For instance, previous research has investigated individuals practicing
“safe computing practices” such as changing passwords and updating security software
(Boss et al. 2015; Workman et al. 2008). Opportunities are courses of action that seek to
derive benefits from these changes (Baron 2006). Individuals may recognize these
opportunities as an effort to form beliefs regarding whether or not enacting a course of
action could lead to benefits such as the convenience of continuing work from home in
order to meet work deadlines (Shepherd et al. 2007).
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Idealism/Rationalization
In the investigative context of this study, rationalization is built from one of
Forsyth’s distinct ethical belief, idealism (Forsyth 1980). Forsyth theorizes that individual
moral beliefs and attitudes are part of an integrated conceptual system of personal ethics.
Forsyth’s (1980) model suggests that moral judgment will vary according to their
position on idealism and relativism. This study focuses only on idealism as individuals
making ethical judgments in business-related issues had a higher sense of idealistic
ideology (Barnett et al. 1994).
Individuals high in idealism seek to always avoid harm by assuming proper
action, good consequences can be obtained (Davis et al. 2001). In the context of
intentional ISP violations, an employee’s level of idealism will encourage them to follow
ISPs since ISPs are considered to be the organization’s security code of conduct (Forsyth
1980). Technological idealism is an individual’s belief that technology should not be
used to harm anyone (Chatterjee et al. 2015). Technological idealism is based on the
notion that any technology-related action should maximize the (good) consequences.
Typically, using IT unethically increases the likelihood of causing harm to others.
For example, intentionally violating ISP behaviors such as voluntarily disregarding
company ISP to copy sensitive work data to bring home to meet work deadlines could
lead to data breaches (handling sensitive data insecurely). Applied to ISP, idealism in
information technology can be conceptualized as an ISP which describes an ideal or a
moral code of conduct for the organization’s employees to follow. Thus, if actions
conflict with ISPs, it is deemed to be wrong or punishable. Hence, it can be assumed that
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individuals who have a high level of technological idealism would tend to have a
negative attitude toward intentional ISP violations.
Work Pressure
The pressure part of the fraud triangle is construed as work-related stress
(Cavanaugh et al. 2000). The US audit standard describes it as “employees have an
incentive or are under pressure, which provides a reason to commit fraud” (PCAOB,
2015, AU 316.07). (Albrecht et al. 2008) give examples of pressures such as needing to
report results better than actual performance, experiencing frustration with work, and
finding a need to circumvent internal controls for the organization’s systems. Employees
who face unreasonable work deadlines or are given a large number of responsibilities
with unmanageable expectations are considered under work-related stress.
New global business models and the digital age have shifted expectations of
employees. There is a sizeable body of research demonstrating a relationship between
performance goals and employee performance (Deci 1972; Guzzo 1979; Latham et al.
1978; Locke et al. 1981). When the performance goals or objectives become too
challenging, this can become a source of work pressure. Although there are many sources
of pressure on employees, I specifically focus on the relationship of work pressure
towards job performance. Work pressure has been defined as the extent to which the “job
performance required in a job is excessive or overload due to performance required on a
job” (Iverson and Maguire 2000). Work pressure has been found as a critical determinant
of worker stress and health, especially in offices with computer work (Carayon 1995;
Carayon et al. 2003). In this study, work pressure is defined as the perception of high job
demands that never seem to diminish, which include tight deadlines that people have a
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hard time keeping up with. Work pressure is found in many work environments
nowadays (Andries et al. 1996; Carayon and Zijlstra 1999). Understanding the role of
perceptions of work pressure is essential especially in understanding why intentional but
non-malicious ISP violations occur.
Work Completion Justification
Employees may view security as an obstacle to finishing their day-to-day work
tasks (Dourish et al. 2004). For example, employees dislike booting their computer in
order to deal with security configurations. The persistence of virus checkers, intrusion
detectors, and other similar systems all interrupt current work flow to insist on timely
security updates can be problematic to employees (Dourish et al. 2004; Guo et al. 2011).
Complying with ISPs are normally not a part of employee’s job performance evaluation
(Besnard and Arief 2004).
Thus, in this study, I assume this as an indication that job performance is more
important to employees than complying with ISPs (i.e. finishing their allocated work on
time). As employees are more concerned with their job performance, ISPs will more
likely be ignored. Employees may also intentionally choose to bypass security measure if
doing so can help them complete their work and improve job evaluations (Guo et al.
2011; Post and Kagan 2007). Therefore, in my study work completion justification is
defined to the extent to which employees will justify their actions to help them complete
their job (i.e. copying sensitive company data to bring home to complete their work).
Table 2-2 to summarize the constructs used in this study.
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Table 2-2
Constructs Used in the Study
Construct Name
Independent Variables
Opportunity

Rationalization/Idealism

General Work-Related
Pressure
Work Completion
Justification

Definition (source)
The extent to which circumstances exist when there is
an absence of controls, ineffective controls, or ability
to override control ( PCAOB 2015 AU 316.07).
Individuals believes that any technology-related action
should maximize the good without harming another
(Forsyth 1980; Chatterjee et. al 2015).
The extent to which a job involves employees
perceiving general work related stress (Cavanaugh et
al. 2000).
Reconstructing harmful ISP violations (i.e. copying
sensitive company data to a USB to bring home) as
getting the job done more efficiently and meeting
deadlines whether it is for personal accomplishments
or because they feel like they are doing a service for
their organization (Guo et al. 2011; Siponen and
Vance 2010)

Dependent Variable
Intentional ISP non-malicious To the extent to which an employee will engage in
Violation
voluntary intentional ISP volitional behavior without
malicious intents and no financial gains (i.e. copying
data on insecure USB drive to bring home in order to
complete their work) (Guo et al. 2011)

Hypotheses Development
There is a growing body of academic security literature with an emphasis on
behavioral security issues (Siponen and Vance 2010; Spears and Barki 2010; Warkentin
and Willison 2009; Willison and Warkentin 2013). By merging the issues being
examined in the IS security policy literature to the specific phenomenon of employees
voluntarily violating ISP policies in order to complete their work duties, I link numerous
factors including the opportunity provided to employees to copy data to bring home,
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work pressure, a sense of idealism towards technology, and the sense of work completion
to reveal a deeper understanding of non-malicious but intentional violations of ISPs.
The first component of the fraud triangle is the perception of opportunity. The US
audit standard defines opportunity as when “circumstances exist, for example, the
absence of controls, ineffective controls, or the ability of management to override
controls – that provide an opportunity for fraud to be perpetrated” (PCAOB, 2015, AU
316.07). Opportunities for the commission of these violations of internal controls are
likely to manifest themselves when employees sense that they might be able to safely use
their credentials to circumvent internal Information Technology (IT) security controls.
Opportunities to violate ISP’s result from circumstances that provide chances to commit
these violations of trust. Employees are often charged with specific workloads and
finishing their job involves a high degree of employee judgment and subjectivity to time
management. Because one can perceive opportunities within an organization to copy data
to bring home to work without repercussions, the following hypothesis has been drawn
out:
H1: Opportunity is positively associated with the likelihood to commit intentional
but non-malicious ISP violations.
The second component of the fraud triangle is rationalization. Rationalization is
defined as an attitude or character that leads one or more individuals to commit an
intentional but non-malicious ISP violation rationally (Goles et al. 2006). Rationalization
happens when individuals who commit violations against the organization desire to do so
without incurring negative self-perceptions, so they will typically seek to rationalize their
actions to themselves (Dorminey et al. 2012). In the context of this study, employees may
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engage in actions (i.e., violating security policies) which may be seen as legitimate means
to their desired ends (i.e., job performance). In 1989, Sharp, an early psychologist
interested in moral judgment, examined individual variations in approaches to moral
judgment. The focus of this study is on the second major dimension of moral judgment
focuses on idealism in one’s moral attitudes (Forsyth 1980). Because one can rationalize
or attempt to self-justify their actions to commit intentional but non-malicious ISP
violations, the following hypothesis has been drawn out:
H2: Rationalization is negatively associated with the likelihood to commit
intentional but non-malicious ISP violations.
The third component of the fraud triangle is perceived pressure. The subject of
unwanted pressure has extensively been examined in organizational and psychology
literature (Hay and Gray 1974; Rodell and Judge 2009). I offer a different avenue for
understanding employee’s intent to commit intentional but non-malicious ISP violations
– namely, work-related pressure. Work-related pressure is felt when the pressure is being
applied by employees to minimize their work effort. This type of work pressure
introduces security risks as the relentless pressure to perform work may result in
employees taking risks to respond to this pressure (Allam et al. 2014). Employees may
perceive little to no control over the perceived pressure for the security requirements
imposed upon them by the organization (D'Arcy et al. 2014). For instance, the timeconsuming security requirements may hinder an employee’s job and further increase the
pressure for employees to circumvent information system controls. Many industries
require periodic security training sessions that expose employees to new security
requirements (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2018). These new requirements may cause more
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risks as employees need to continually adjust to new requirements with little time to
develop a normalized work routine. Work-related pressure can be threatening for
employees and raise perceptions of pressure. Therefore, the following hypothesis has
been drawn out:
H3: Perceived general work-related pressure is positively associated with the
likelihood to commit intentional but non-malicious ISP violations.
Although there are many sources of pressure on employees that serve as
motivations for intentional but non-malicious ISP violations, I focus on the relationship
of work completeness as justification for the intentional but non-malicious ISP violation.
Previous research has demonstrated that employees are feeling more stressed at work
(Taylor et al. 1997). A recent study from Staples Business Advantage (White 2016)
found that over 75% of employees work more than 40 hours a week. However, instead of
spending it to get ahead on work, employees are using their extra hours to stay afloat to
meet organization deadlines. For employees that use IS in an organization setting, making
decisions to complete their work remotely may involve copying sensitive organizational
data to a mobile data storage device to bring home to finish their assigned tasks.
Performance goals or objectives can be a source of work pressure. Managers may
impose objectives for employees without regard to the complexities of the job or without
making adjustments for the skill and responsibilities of the employee. Employees may
feel overwhelmed as they pursue to so satisfy all these performance objectives (Marsden
and French 1998). Although the purpose of performance objectives is to set specific and
challenging goals for employees when goals become excessive, employees begin to use
this need to complete their work as justification to meet their performance goals by
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whatever means (e.g. intentionally violating ISP’s) (Locke et al. 1981). When work
performance is the goal that users try to accomplish, security often becomes a trivial task.
Receiving high work performance evaluations can be seen as a positive outcome
that employees attempt to achieve (Dobre 2013; Longenecker et al. 1987). Therefore, the
significant influence of work performance confirms that work completion will be an
essential decision factor when employees deal with specific security issues. For example,
if an action can help employees carry out their assigned tasks, improve productivity, and
complete their work, employees will likely engage in the action even if the action violates
organizational ISPs. Thus, violating ISPs would not become a problem for employees if
these violations help complete their work. Therefore, the following hypotheses have been
drawn out:
H4a: Work completeness justification will positively moderate the effectiveness of
perceived opportunity to intentionally commit a non-malicious ISP violation.
H4b: Work completeness justification will negatively moderate the effectiveness
of perceived level of idealism to intentionally commit a non-malicious ISP
violation.
H4c: Work completeness justification will positively moderate the effectiveness of
perceived level of idealism to intentionally commit a non-malicious ISP violation.
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The resulting research model is illustrated in Figure 2-2.

Figure 2-2: Research Model

Methodology
Measures
I utilized an online survey instrument for data collection. The measurement items
in my questionnaire were adapted from existing validated and well-tested scales in the
extant literature. In addition to using previously validated questions, all measures were
pretested by two business professors with expertise in survey research and ten
professionals with ISP experience. The objective of the pretest was to ensure that the
measures were meaningful and that they unambiguously captured the domain of each
construct. Based on detailed interviews with each participant, appropriate changes were
made to the measures.
All measures were pilot tested in a survey with a small portion of targeted
samples, which only resulted in minor wording changes. I conducted a reliability analysis
and exploratory factor analysis for each set of measures. The validity and reliability of
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the adapted measures fulfilled the necessary requirements, which indicated all measures
were clear to the targeted samples, relevant and captured the intended concepts. The
results placed sufficient confidence in the measures to proceed with the survey
administration of the target sample frame. In the questionnaire, all items were measured
with 5-point Likert scales, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”
Sample
I used a market research firm to invite participants to take my survey. External
panelists have been used increasingly in IS research (Ayyagari et al. 2011; Bulgurcu et al.
2010) and have certain advantages over traditional methods that were key to my study.
First, panels guarantee respondent anonymity and thereby encourage honest responses to
questions that may be subject socially desirable responses. Second, external panels
contain respondents from a wide range of industries and positions. The marketing
research firm was instructed to collect responses from employed computer-using
professionals. The research firm paid participants a small amount for their participation.
Respondents were paid $10 each for participating in the study. In the questionnaire, the
targeted samples were first asked to indicate their computer experience in the company. If
a targeted sample had not used a computer in the company, that person was excluded
from further consideration. The questionnaire then asked the respondents to measure the
subjects’ perceptions of opportunity, idealism and work-related pressure in terms of
following information security policies, and the intentional ISP violation.
A total of 574-panel members accepted the invitation to participate in the survey
by viewing the consent agreement and clicking past the first page. After excluding
incomplete responses, I used a data set of 209 responses in all analyses. Table 2-3 shows
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sample demographics for these respondents. All employees sampled must use a computer
to complete their daily work tasks. Sample demographics reveal that 62 percent were
female and tended to be well-educated (71 percent with at least a bachelor’s degree).

Table 2-3
Sample Distribution by Classification
Gender
Female
Male

Total

Count
129
80

209

Education
High-school
2 year degree
4 year degree
Professional
Degree
Doctorate
Total

Count
29
31
93
53
3
209

Control Variables
To account for rival explanations of the intentional ISP violation, I implemented
several control variables in this study. I recognize that the behavioral intention to commit
intentional but non-malicious ISP violations might also be influenced by respondents’
characteristics, such as age, gender, education, accounting responsibilities, and perception
of monitoring within an organization. The examination of the control variables and their
influence on the intention to voluntarily commit intentional non-malicious ISP violations
revealed that none of these significantly influenced how employees may formulate their
intentions to do so.
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Data Analysis and Results
The research model was tested using PLS. PLS is a component-based structural
equation modeling technique, which facilitates simultaneous tests of measurement
models and structural models and is particularly suitable for testing nonlinear effect such
as moderation (Chin 1998; Chin et al. 2003). PLS is well suited for the predictive nature
of this study, and properly assessed the relative influence of the fraud triangle to the
likelihood of an intentional ISP violation. Further, the use of PLS is appropriate mainly
because of the early theoretical development nature of the study (Gefen et al. 2011). PLS
was employed to both validate the measurement instrument and test the research model.
PLS supports simultaneous analyses of multiple indicator variables and enables
empirical testing of extensive interactions among the moderator and latent predictors.
This model was evaluated using PLS to illustrate how multiple interaction effects work
together. I assessed measurement validity in three ways. First, convergent validity was
assessed by how each item was related to its corresponding construct by examining the
factor loadings. Convergent validity is considered satisfactory if the factor loading of a
measure is 0.7 or higher. All factor loadings were above the cutoff point of 0.70 with a tvalue higher than 1.96. The measures loaded on their appropriate factors and there was no
evidence of significant cross-loading. Average variance extracted (AVE) was also
examined to evaluate convergent validity. AVE is greater than 0.5, establishing
convergent validity. As a result, each construct had an AVE greater than 0.5, suggesting
that the measures exhibited adequate convergent validity.
Second, the reliability of the measures was examined through two criteria,
Cronbach’s alpha (CA) and composite reliability (CR). The CA and CR of construct was
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greater than 0.7, a common threshold for signifying satisfactory construct reliability.
According to the results, the minimum CA and CR values exceed the recommended
threshold of 0.7, indicating acceptable reliability of the measures. These tables are
presented in the Appendices.
Third, discriminant validity is verified by the difference between the AVE of a
construct and its correlation with other constructs. For adequate discriminant validity, the
square roots of AVE of any construct should be greater than the correlations between the
construct and other construct, which means that the diagonal elements should be greater
than corresponding off-diagonal ones. (Fornell and Larcker 1981). As a result, the
criterion for sufficient discriminant validity was also met in this study. I tested for
common method variance (CMV) through Harman’s single-factor test by conducting an
exploratory factor analysis to determine whether all measures loaded on a single factor
(Podsakoff et al. 2003). The measures in the data set loaded on separate factors, so
common method bias did not appear to be a serious problem.
The proposed hypotheses were tested through the examination of the structural
model as presented in Figure 2-3. For increased robustness and statistical validity, a
bootstrap resampling procedure was used with 1,000 resamples. The standardized PLS
path coefficients for testing the structural model are shown in Figure 2-3. The model
accounts for a significant portion of the variance in intentional ISP violation (R2 = 40
percent). Overall, PLS analyses generally confirm that the fraud triangle (i.e.,
opportunity, rationalization and work pressure) significantly influences intentional ISP
violation. More specifically, opportunity (path coefficient = 0.13, p < 0.05) and work
pressure (path coefficient = 0.19, p < 0.05) had significant, positive effects on intentional
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ISP violation, in support of H1 and H3. However, idealism had an insignificant effect on
intentional ISP violation (path coefficient = -0.06, p > 0.05). Therefore, H2 was not
supported.

Figure 2-3: Predictive Model Results

I followed the steps proposed by Aiken and West (Aiken and West 1991) to
examine the moderation hypotheses. The interaction terms were mean-centered prior to
creating the interaction variables in order to reduce the potential for collinearity (Chin et
al. 2003). Work completion justification positively moderated the positive effect of work
pressure on intentional ISP (path coefficient = 0.14, p < 0.05). However, it did not
moderate the positive effect of opportunity on intentional ISP violation (path coefficient
= -0.05, n.s.). Therefore, H4c was supported while H4a was not.
Interestingly, work completion justification negatively moderated the effect of
idealism on intentional ISP. Therefore, H4b was supported.
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Discussion and Theoretical Implications
This study is motivated by a desire to understand different possible motivations
for non-malicious but intentional ISP violations. I examine how the elements of the fraud
triangle will affect an individual’s intention to copy company data to bring home with the
influence of an individual’s desire to complete their assigned workload. After carefully
considering the investigative goal of the study, I determined that opportunity and work
pressure have a significant positive relationship with intentional ISP violation intentions.
However, an individual’s level of idealism did not show a significant effect on company
data copying intention. At the edges, idealism has a strong significant relationship with
attitude (Chatterjee et al. 2015). Thus, idealism is related to attitude only when the
idealism perceptions are either very strong or very weak. For these reasons, it explains
why idealism did not have a strong relationship with an employee's intention to commit
ISP violations.
The results revealed that work justification positively influences the impact of
work pressure on ISP violation intention but negatively moderates the effect of the
idealism. Work justification had no significant moderating effect on the effectiveness of
the perception for ISP violating opportunity. These findings provide new insight into the
understanding of the employees' data copying behavior and implications for future
studies.
First, the fraud triangle theory appears to be a useful framework for identifying
why certain ISP’s and regulations will be violated by incorporating work pressure, as an
essential antecedent to violating with ISP for copying data and bringing it home to work.
(D'Arcy et al. 2014) identified that ISP demands are a form of particular stress that causes
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employees to react negatively and commit ISP violations. I provide a more fine-grained
view of the specific type of ISP violating behavior (i.e., copying company data to bring
home) with the work pressure. I extend the understanding of the role of potential
pressures on ISP violating behaviors.
Furthermore, previous research has revealed that copying data can be a severe
concern for organizations when malicious employees take sensitive information and
create information leaks that can lead to costly financial losses (Abu-Musa 2006; Renaud
2011). On the other hand, while employees continue to experience the opportunity to
violate ISP policies, this study shows that their most significant driving motivation is the
overwhelming work pressure they face to complete their job. In short, these results
suggest that work pressure (or different types of pressure) may play a critical reason for
the non-malicious but intentional ISP violations.
Second, information security research has focused on enhancing an employee’s
ethical stance towards ISP violation intention. (Leiwo and Heikkuri 1998; Ruighaver et
al. 2010) stated the use of ethics in information security has two purposes: to identify the
criteria between “good” and bad and thus to promote good desires. Prior studies have
suggested establishing guidelines for an individual's accountability towards moral
intensity (Chia and Lim 2000; Robin et al. 1996), enforcing a code of ethics (Harrington
1996), and implementing ethical decision-making aids (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Goles et al.
2006). The fraud triangle, which is the focal theory of this study, suggests that an
individual’s rationalization/idealism stance would reduce the possibility of committing
violation behaviors (Schuchter and Levi 2016; Sorunke 2016). In my study, I capture an
employee’s good desires with their level of idealism. I also focus on the non-ethical issue
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of copying data to complete their work, as opposed to personal gain, which belongs in the
domain of non-malicious but intentional violations. Without a better understanding of the
non-malicious intentions of employees, strengthening the user attitudes towards ISP
compliance seems unlikely.
Lastly, increasing the knowledge of the work completion justification for an
employee is also relevant because of the consistently significant link between work
performance and work stress (Abramis 1994; Fisher 2001; Jamal 1984; Motowidlo et al.
1986). The issue of work completion justification enforces an individual’s concept of
self-identity (Lee et al. 2006). In the context of an organization, an individual’s selfidentity is generally their sense of purpose or responsibilities. Finishing their assigned
work becomes a stable self-concept and can encourage individuals to engage in behaviors
that will be consistent with this bottom line. In order to complete their assigned workload
and continue their “purpose” at the organization, employees will use identity enhancing
events that only improves their psychological well-being even if it means violating ISPs
to achieve these goals. On the contrary, employees tend to avoid behaviors that are
inconsistent with their organizational self-identity. Being unable to complete their work
may be seen as identity-threatening events that may lead to decreased psychological wellbeing. In other words, when employees feel that ISPs do not help carry out business tasks
and improve productivity, employees will likely engage in behaviors even if these
behaviors violate organizational ISPs (Guo 2013; Guo et al. 2011). Utilized in an
organizational context, an employee could argue that he/she must violate ISPs in order to
get his/her work done (Siponen and Iivari 2006).
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Therefore, a significant influence of work completion justification can be
interpreted as a positive outcome that employees try to achieve. The significant influence
of work completion is an important decision factor when employees are concerned with
security policies that may hinder their workload. Rather than merely accepting the need
to have additional security policies to prevent catastrophic organizational ISP violations, I
explore the idea that ISPs may need to be reconsidered to reduce this conflict.

Implications for Practice
With the growth of computer technology, employees may feel that the higher
demands of their work, such as, pressing deadlines, create an environment that
encourages employees to copy data to take out of the office in order to complete their
work assigned to them. The results suggest that a shift in IS security management may be
necessary and also suggest a need to reevaluate the importance of certain ISPs within an
organization. IS management should address the important issue of what they can do to
help employees with their job in order to create a security-friendly culture.
Employees are practical, and they care about completing their workload more
than IS security. When implementing a security policy, IS management should first
understand what this policy means for employees and how it will affect their daily work
tasks. IS management can also explore avenues that will restrict bringing work home in
order to eliminate this specific ISP violation further. For example, high-tech companies
may start directly using the local area network in the workplace and leave no interface for
copying company data to portable media. IS management needs to align the security
objectives with employee objectives.
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This study has indicated an association between the evaluation of employee work
performance as a significant influence on an employee’s compliance with ISPs. Previous
studies have suggested that organizations should utilize periodic security education,
training, and awareness programs in order to reduce the uncertainty towards ISPs.
However, in intentional yet non-malicious ISP violations, organizations, may fare by
better putting resources towards a critical examination of what is considered necessary
ISP compliance and how certain ISP violations can affect the business performance of the
organization. IS managers should examine how employees’ workload collide with the
rapid speed ISPs are being implemented rather than focusing on implementing more
security measures.

Limitations and Additional Future Research
As with many other behavioral security research projects, this project is limited
by the use of intention instead of actual behavior as the dependent variable. How
intention translates to actual conduct is not completely clear, but the limited focus on
intention is consistent with the majority of information security studies (Paternoster
2010).
A second limitation of this study is the consequence of using a scenario-based
research design. As (Siponen and Vance 2010; Willison et al. 2018) explained, the
participants in a study involving scenarios of policy violations may have already been
involved in similar experiences and may feel compelled to conceal their true intentions
because they perceived this behavior as socially undesirable. Previous research (Siponen
and Vance 2010; Willison et al. 2018) suggested that the expected number of previous
violators in their sample pool was likely to be insufficient to skew the results of the study.
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Because of the sample size used in the present study, it is reasonable for this study to
infer the same expectation.
Third, the model focuses on a specific type of non-malicious but intentional ISP
violation intention as the ultimate dependent variable, thereby limiting the scope of the
study. Future research should investigate different types of non-malicious ISP violations
(i.e. password sharing, avoiding timely security patches). Additional research can
consider incorporating both individual factors and institutional factors (i.e., tone at the
top, organizational climate) to explain the motivation to violate ISPs intentionally.
Further research may be able to explain the layers of rationalization employees encounter
when shaping their intention to violate ISPs.

Conclusion
In this study, I utilized the fraud triangle theory to determine whether employees
develop a strong sense of work pressure that drives their intention to deliberately violate
ISP policies to complete their work on a timely basis. The results of this study are
important for three reasons. First, I expand the theoretical boundaries of the fraud triangle
into the IS domain. Second, I provide an essential contribution to the current IS
discussion to find a different motivation for the specific intentional but non-malicious ISP
violating behavior (i.e., copying company data to complete work). Lastly, this study
examines the significant influence of work completion as an essential decision factor
when employees are considering ISP violations. The results of this study also suggest
how future research can build on the current findings to develop effective strategies to aid
in creating and implementing ISPs.

CHAPTER 3

ESSAY 2: UNEXPECTED EFFECT OF INFORMATION
SECURITY POLICIES ON ACCOUNTING EMPLOYEES’
INFORMATION SECURITY VIOLATION BEHAVIOR
Introduction
In today’s business, information security management is a critical issue. There are
often strict organizational controls known as information security policies (ISP) to avoid
these potential information security problems. However, not only have stringent security
controls failed to achieve the expected effect, but they have resulted in even more
intentional ISP violations (Alge 2001; George 1996; Hsu et al. 2015; Lowry and Moody
2015; Posey et al. 2011a; Sewell and Barker 2006). Studies have shown that a class of
employee security-related behaviors known as intentional ISP violations (D'Arcy et al.
2014), such as password sharing, sharing insider information, and unauthorized USBusage, continue to plague organizations. For example, a recent Pricewaterhouse Coopers
survey shows that current employees account for the highest amount of security incidents
at 30% (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2018). Accounting employees are essential
organizational insiders, who have an inherently higher risk of exposing organizations to
information security threats. This risk is, in large part, due to their management and
oversight of critical financial data used to predict the organization operating condition
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and financial health of the company. Ineffectively managing accountants may result in
countless problems for the company, not the least of which are reputational problems,
loss of stock value, material financial reporting errors, and financial losses (Amiram et al.
2018; Fritz et al. 2014; Skaife et al. 2013). Given the accounting employee’s importance
to an organization, there has still yet to be a specific study to examine an accountant’s
ISP violation behavior. Therefore, this study aims to examine the effects of the
organizational controls on the ISP-violating behavior of accountants.
In current information security literature, different organizational controls on
information security compliance of general employees have been thoroughly examined,
but have produced mixed results (Lowry and Moody 2015). Controls have been identified
as either formal controls or informal controls (Eisenhardt 1985). Formal controls are
properly documented and presented by specifications, evaluations, and
rewards/punishments (Eisenhardt 1985; Hsu et al. 2015; Kirsch 1996). Informal controls
are unwritten and often enforced by employees (Eisenhardt 1985; Hsu et al. 2015).
Between the two types of controls, formal and informal, formal controls are considered
more effective (Heales et al. 2007; Hsu et al. 2015). Most information security studies
examine the line of formal control perspective have adopted deterrence theories and
observed how the presence of sanctions drive employees to comply with expectations
(D'arcy and Herath 2011; D'Arcy et al. 2009; Herath and Rao 2009; Hu et al. 2011;
Willison et al. 2018). In order to be consistent with prior research, I consider ISP controls
as formal controls. In this study, ISPs are considered to be a set of formalized procedures
and guidelines which instruct employees their responsibilities to protect and use the
information and technology resources of their organizations (Bulgurcu et al. 2010;
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D'Arcy et al. 2009) properly. For example, control theory incorporates the concept of
mandatoriness to argue that when individuals perceive ISPs as mandatory; they will more
likely take security precautions (Boss et al. 2009). A common area of focus among these
studies are on the effects of formal sanctions, which are explicit penalties for certain
forms of misconduct (Siponen et al. 2012), and how they encourage desired behaviors
and discourage undesired behaviors.
Interestingly, based on reactance theory, Lowry and Moody (2015) found that
even with high levels of ISP controls, it could result in unintended consequences and
increase undesirable employee behaviors in organizations. The reason appears to be that
most employees have a tacit limit for the degree of tolerance they will feel towards
management policies that are controlling and a similar threshold for how much individual
freedom they will give up before negative consequences for the organization will occur
(Lowry and Moody 2015). Other research has also provided evidence that ISP controls
could result in a negative effect on the general employee’s security compliance (Ariss
2002; Dhillon 2001; Posey et al. 2011a; Stanton et al. 2005). Therefore, as the levels of
ISP control continue to increase, it is plausible that there may be an unintended negative
consequence on intentional ISP violating behavior. The objective of this study is to
examine how might ISP controls affect the accountant’s intentional ISP violation
behavior.
The fraud triangle has long been considered as a noteworthy theoretical lens to
explain the effect of management controls as anti-fraud behaviors (Cressey 1953;
Dorminey et al. 2010; Murphy and Free 2015; Murphy and Free 2016). The dimensions
of the fraud triangle could be used as a meta-model to improve the anti-fraud efforts to
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prevent, deter, detect, investigate, and remediate fraud (Dorminey et al. 2012). For
example, Murphy and Free (2016) suggested organizational climate as one type of
organizational control that could effectively reduce fraud behavior via three dimensions
of the fraud triangle. On the other hand, while the fraud triangle theory has been mainly
used to explain the malicious fraud behavior or criminal behavior, others such as
(Murphy and Free 2016) have pointed out that the fraud triangle has been called into
question for its narrow interpretation (Morales et al. 2014) and lack of
comprehensiveness (Murphy and Free 2015).
Cressey 1953 conceptualized the fraud as a violation of trust such that the fraud
triangle could be generally used to understand offenders when committing negative trustviolating judgments. As such, I argue that the fraud triangle could be able to explain the
non-malicious yet still intentional violating behavior of accountants. Specifically, I
consider the effect of ISP controls on intentional ISP violation behavior along with the
three elements (opportunity, rationalization/attitude, and pressure) of the fraud triangle in
the context of accountants and their daily work responsibilities.
Opportunity refers to the perceived possibility of successfully committing the
wrongdoing without being reported to the organization (Dorminey et al. 2012).
Therefore, the opportunity arises when there is an absence of controls, ineffective
controls, or the ability to override controls. In the accounting ISP violation context, the
opportunity is generally conceptualized as the cost for accountants to gain unauthorized
access to the organizational information system or other employees’ computers. Given
collaboration among accountants has been an indispensable part of an accountant’s daily
work, high levels of ISP violating opportunity exist for accountants. For example,
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accountants often work in a collaborative environment (El-Sayed and Westrup 2011).
However, this may result in inexperienced, unmotivated, uncooperative, poor adaptation
to technological advances in the industry, knowledge sharing risks, and regulation risks
(Bhimani and Willcocks 2014; Coras and Tantau 2013; Low et al. 2008). In the context
of ISP violation behavior, team members may intentionally share passwords or failure to
secure workstations in order to ensure their accounting team continues to perform work
duties as quickly as possible.
Second, rationalization or a change in attitude to commit computer fraud
happens when individuals make a conscious decision to use technology to present
fraudulent or misrepresented information for a personal gain (e.g. asset
misappropriations) (Bell and Carcello 2000). In this study, employees’ morality, using
idealism as a proxy, will play its role in rationalizing their ISP compliance. Idealism is
one of the two distinct ethical beliefs formed from Forsyth’s ethical model. The original
model theorizes that individual moral beliefs and attitudes are integrated with their
personal level of ethics (Forsyth 1980). Forsyth’s (1980) model suggests that moral
judgment will vary according to an individual’s level of idealism and relativism. In this
study, I focus only on idealism because individuals making ethical judgments in
business-related issues have had a higher sense of idealistic ideology (Barnett et al.
1994). In the context of ISP violation intentions, I argue when accounting employees
hold themselves to a higher standard of ethics, this will prevent them from violating the
organization’s ISP regardless of the circumstances.
Finally, pressure as the third dimension of the fraud triangle could facilitate
employees with an incentive to commit fraud, which provides the most influential
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motivation for fraud. Accounting professionals are known to have high-pressure jobs and
are subjected to stress from many sources including elements such as work-life balance,
dealing with demanding clients, inflexible deadlines, and meeting requirements expected
of them in an organization such as staying up to date with the technological skills and
accounting standards (Collins and Killough 1992; Viator 2001). In the context of
accounting employees’ ISP violating intention, ISP controls can create stress in
accounting employees (known with high-pressure). Therefore, this form of employee
stress termed ISP pressure may theoretically be a contributor to ISP violations. Higher
ISP controls, thus, may increase the intentional ISP violating behaviors by increasing ISP
pressure.
In short, I examine the effects of ISP controls on the triad of factors brought by
the fraud triangle on intentional ISP violations caused by accounting employees.
Therefore, the first goal of this study is to determine how organizational ISP controls will
influence accounting employees’ ISP violating behavior via the fraud triangle elements.
I further explore the influence of organizational ISP controls on accounting
employee’s ISP pressure. The accounting profession is often known as a high-pressure
profession. Therefore, accountants may adopt demands more quickly than other
employees. However, whether the implementation of additional ISP controls will result in
accountants’ ISP pressure may depend on the extent they think they can effectively
respond to the ISP requirements. ISP self-efficacy thus captures the capacity of how
accountants can complete their job using technology while simultaneously complying
with ISP requirements. This self-efficacy could be an essential personal characteristic to
consider as a side effect of ISP controls on ISP pressure.
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Due to the rise in cybersecurity incidents, there have been increasingly more
changes and additions to accounting regulations. These changes have brought about more
uncertainty to the accountant’s work environment (Hamdan 2017; Steinbart et al. 2018).
ISPs are designed and deployed based on specific business processes. Therefore, the
implementation of new accounting rules means that new ISPs should be devised by
adding or modifying existing ISPs. Therefore, I argue the accountants’ work uncertainty
from accounting-rule changes will be another essential condition to enhance the effect of
ISP controls on ISP pressure. Whether organizations are adding new ISPs or modifying
an existing ISP, both require mental and behavioral adjustments, which both result in
more ISP pressure. Therefore, the second goal of this study is to examine whether the
effect organizational ISP controls on ISP pressure will be weakened by an accountant’s
ISP self-efficacy but will be enhanced by the level of work uncertainty perceived by an
accountant.
Based upon the fraud triangle theory, in the context of accounting employees’
ISP violating behavior, I develop and test a model that evaluates the effects of how higher
levels of information security controls within an organization can have an unintended
impact on accounting employee’s ISP pressure levels to commit intentional ISP
violations. Furthermore, I consider how ISP self-efficacy as a personal characteristic and
how perceived work uncertainty may be a significant environmental characteristic for
determining the unintended impact of ISP controls on ISP stress. Based on the analysis of
a data set of 163 responses from accountants, it does appear that although ISP controls
will significantly reduce accounting employees' opportunity to violate ISPs. They also
increase violating intention by increasing the ISP pressure of accounting employees. The
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effect of ISP controls on ISP pressure is reduced by the ISP self-efficacy but is enhanced
by the perceived work uncertainty.
These findings contribute to the literature by (1) proposing and confirming ISP
stress as the key factor to explain the side effect of organizational ISP controls on the
violating intention of accounting employees, which extends the suggestion of the
“pressure” aspect of the fraud triangle theory; (2) to the best of my knowledge, be the
first to consider newly emerging intentional ISP violation behaviors of accountants in the
extant accounting literature; (3) identifying high work uncertainty and low ISP selfefficacy as possible explanations for the high ISP stress of accountants when facing high
levels of controls.

Theoretical Background
Management control over the processes, activities, and behaviors of employees
has been an integral part of any organization (Zimmerman 2006) and also a significant
concern in the accounting literature stream (Fiolleau et al. 2018). Management control
includes any systems managers use to ensure the behavior and decisions of their
employees are aligned with an organization’s objective and goals (Malmi and Brown
2008). For example, accounting controls like budgets and performance measures,
administrative controls including organizational structure and governance, and social
controls such as values and culture must be assimilated in the management control
system (Fiolleau et al. 2018). Although management controls have pledged effective
organizational operations, there has been evidence that suggest otherwise. Research has
suggested that these formal management controls can negatively affect the attitudes and
behaviors of employees subjected to these controls (Christ et al. 2008; Das and Teng
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2001; Dineen et al. 2006). Negative consequences of control include decreased effort and
cooperation, reduced organizational citizenship behavior, and in extreme cases, employee
fraud or theft (Christ 2013; Das and Teng 1999; Das and Teng 2001; Dunlop and Lee
2004).
The accounting literature recognizes ISP as a type of mandatory control system
(Boss et al. 2009; Dopuch et al. 1974). Previous research has shown that when policies
are implemented into an organization, this is a signal to employees. Employees are then
expected to comply with the new changes (Chae and Poole 2005; Malhotra and Galletta
2005). Using the control theory to view the concept of mandatoriness, it is evident when
employees perceive ISPs as mandatory; they are more likely to take security precautions
(Boss et al. 2009). In this study, the term organizational formal ISP controls refer to the
existing organizational formal general ISP policies.
Previous research has also used the reactance theory as a theoretical lens to
explain why high levels of ISP controls could backfire and increase undesirable employee
behavior (Lowry and Moody 2015; Posey et al. 2011a). The reason being most
employees have a tacit limit for the degree of tolerance they will feel towards
management policies that are controlling and a similar threshold for how much individual
freedom they will give up before negative consequences for the organization will occur.
In short, studies have indicated that management controls on employees may not achieve
the expected outcomes, especially the ISP controls. However, there is still a need for a
deeper understanding and explanation of the unexpected effect of ISP controls on ISP
violating behavior.
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The fraud triangle has been a well-known conceptual framework for
understanding the drivers of fraud. It has organized part of the management control
literature that focuses on reducing dysfunctional behavior. While the fraud triangle has
been historically used for explaining fraud behavior as wrongful criminal intentional
deception for personal gain involving a violation of trust, researchers have argued that the
fraud triangle could be extended to explain general dysfunctional behaviors of employees
(Cressey 1953; Fiolleau et al. 2018; Ramamoorti 2008; Ramamoorti and Olsen 2007).
Dysfunctional employee behaviors occur when individuals knowingly make a choice that
puts their interests before that of the organization (Cohen et al. 2007), which is not illegal
(e.g., not fraudulent), yet are contrary to the organizational shareholders’ interests. In this
study, dysfunctional behaviors are considered as the intentional but not malicious ISP
violating behaviors of accountants, which is often intentionally committed for
convenience or an expression of one's dissatisfaction but without financial gain, such as
copying sensitive data to USB drives to continue an accountant’s work remotely,
password sharing, failure to logoff computer.
It is generally argued that if all of the three fraud triangle elements — (1)
pressure, (2) opportunity, and (3) attitude or rationalization — are present within the
organization, then dysfunctional behavior risk is higher (Cressey 1953; Fiolleau et al.
2018). In other words, if the organizational management control systems effectively
control the three elements, the dysfunctional behaviors of employees are expected to be
vastly reduced. In the early version of the fraud triangle, these three elements are all
found to be essential (Cressey 1953; Cressey 1954). However, as the fraud triangle
evolved, the relative importance among the three elements is found to be determined by
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the specific dysfunctional behaviors. The level of importance of the three corners of the
triangle has shown to be different when conceptualized in a different context (Dorminey
et al. 2012; Johnson et al. 2013; Trompeter et al. 2013). For example, previous
accounting literature has categorized four different types of dysfunctional behaviors as
misreporting of accounting information, earnings management, illegal actions, and selfinterested investment decisions (Fiolleau et al. 2018). Therefore, these different types of
behaviors suggest different management controls should be uniquely developed to
effectively control the opportunity, rationalization, and pressure under different
circumstances.
Each element of the fraud triangle has been mainly conceptualized to explain
fraudulent behavior, which is commonly known as illegal and malicious behavior. The
pressure for fraud behavior mainly refers to the pressure from a non-shareable financial
problem (Ashton 1990; Cressey 1953; Dorminey et al. 2012). However, in the context of
intentional but non-malicious ISP violating behavior, a non-shareable financial problem
is not expected to be the primary source of pressure. Instead, ISP controls are expected to
become the source of pressure for the violation behavior. The perceived opportunity for
fraud is seldom purposefully provided to the employee. However, in the case of
perceived opportunity for an intentional but not malicious ISP violation, it will be
commonly presented. For example, accounting employees often work in a collaborative
environment (Wessels 2005). This may result in new, unmotivated, uncooperative, poor
adaptation to technological advances in the industry, knowledge sharing risks, and
regulation risks (Bhimani and Willcocks 2014; Coras and Tantau 2013; Low et al. 2008).
In the context of ISP violation behavior, team members may intentionally share
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passwords, encourage remote access to information systems or failure to secure
workstations in order to ensure their accounting team continues to perform work duties as
quickly as possible (Safa et al. 2018). Therefore, the perception of opportunity may not
play as critical a role in intentional ISP violation behavior. The rationalization for
malicious fraudulent behavior is also expected to be more critical than the rationalization
for intentional but non-malicious ISP violations. For example, the ethics of the employees
will prevent them from violating the organization’s ISP, as suggested in the existing
literature (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Chia and Lim 2000; Goles et al. 2006). Therefore, it is
expected that the pressure element of the fraud triangle will be the most critical trait to
explain the effect of ISP controls on accountants’ ISP violating intention. Concise
definitions of all constructs in this study have been listed in Table 3-1.
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Table 3-1
Constructs in the Research Model
General
Concept
Management
Controls

Construct

ISP Controls

ISP Stress

ISP Uncertainty
Pressure
ISP Overload

ISP Complexity

Opportunity
ISP
violation
Opportunity
Rationalization
ISP
violation
Idealism
Work
uncertainty

Operational deﬁnition
The organization’s ISP tools that seek to
elicit behavior that achieves strategic
objectives of an organization, such as
budgets, performance measures, standard
operating procedures, and protection of
digital assets
Employee’s attempts and struggles to deal
with constantly evolving workplace
information security policies and the
cognitive and social requirements to
complete their work duties
Situations where the organization
continually updates and changes its jobrelated security requirements
Situations where security requirements
increase the workload for employees which
may create time pressures for them to
complete job duties
Situations where security requirements are
viewed as overly complex either forcing
employees to expend time and effort in
learning to understand security
requirements or are unable to grasp the
security policy fully
The extent to which circumstances exist
when there is an absence of controls,
ineffective controls, or ability to override
controls
Individual’s belief that any technologyrelated action should maximize the good
without harming another

Individual’s inability to assign probabilities
with confidence with regard to how
Work
environmental/work factors are going to
uncertainty
affect the success or failure of the
accounting employee
Individual’s judgement in their capability to
Computer SelfISP self-efficacy organize and execute information security
efficacy
policies
Any act by an employee that is against the
Fraud behavior Intentional ISP
established information security policy of
(Violation of
violation
the organization
Trust)
intention

Reference

(Free et al. 2007)

(D'Arcy et al.
2014; RaguNathan et al.
2008; Tarafdar et
al. 2010)

PCAOB 2015
AU 316.07
(Chatterjee et al.
2015; Forsyth
1980)
(Colquitt et al.
2012; Duncan
1972)
(Rhee et al.
2009)
(Bulgurcu et al.
2010; Willison
and Warkentin
2013)
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Hypotheses Development
Associations Between ISP Controls and
Elements of the Fraud Triangle
ISPs specify the standards, boundaries, and responsibilities for accountants of
information and technology resources in order to facilitate the prevention, detection, and
response to security incidents (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Lowry and Moody 2015). For
example, the creation of Sarbanes-Oxley began imposing internal control obligations for
accountants (Rockness and Rockness 2005; Wallace et al. 2011; Walters 2007).
Explicitly, Section 302, in addition to certifying the accuracy of disclosures, officers must
affirm that they are responsible for internal controls; and designed such controls to ensure
that material information has been presented to report this conclusion about its
effectiveness. Given perception of opportunity in this study refers to the perceived cost
for accountants able to acquire unauthorized access to the organizational information
system or other employees’ computers by violating some ISP, the perceived opportunity
arises when accountants have the perception (1) that an ISP control weakness is present,
(2) that the likelihood of being caught is remote. Therefore, higher ISP control is
expected to reduce the perceived ISP violating opportunity. Hence, I hypothesize that:
H1a: An accountant’s perceived organizational ISP controls will be negatively
associated with the perceived opportunity to commit ISP violations.
Accountants’ attitude to the ISP violating behaviors or how the accountants will
rationalize the ISP violating behavior will naturally depend on their morality; therefore, I
use idealism as a proxy. Idealism refers to the positive ethical values held by the
employee to prevent them from harming others intentionally(Forsyth 1980). Thus,
individuals high in idealism seek to avoid harm by always assuming the proper action
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(ISP controls). In other words, some employees may possess an attitude or set of ethical
values that allow them to knowingly and intentionally commit a dishonest act against the
organization (Murphy and Free 2016). While attitudes are changeable, as clearly
demonstrated by social psychology research (Elliot and Devine 1994), ethical values
presumed to be one’s beliefs about right versus wrong, are not as easily swayed (Bayou et
al. 2011; Ghoshal 2005; Wenzel 2005). Instead, ethical values are formed gradually as
individual’s gain experience and form knowledge of their surroundings (Bazerman and
Tenbrunsel 2012; Nevins et al. 2007). Therefore, they are less likely to be associated with
ISP controls in the organization. Therefore, I hypothesize:
H1b: An accountant’s perceived organizational ISP controls will be not
significantly associated with their level of idealism.
Early accounting literature has found that the quantity and quality of task
demands (i.e., work-related stressors) and control in organizations are the main
antecedents to cause the accounting employees’ stress (Libby 1983). Therefore, I bring
focus on the stress sourced from the information security tasks and ISP controls for the
accountants. Borrowing the conceptualization of employees’ security-related stress (SRS)
in the IS literature, I conceptualize the ISP pressure of accountants as pressure from
overloaded, complexity, and uncertainty of information security requirements/policies.
Implementation of stringent security controls may trigger undesirable information
security behavior because individuals may feel pressured to perform at the same
operational level before the implementation of ISPs, which can cause employees to view
these controls as constraining, inconvenient, and difficult to understand (Posey et al.
2011a). For example, employees perceive increased security measures as job stressors
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(Moore et al. 2008) and privacy invasions, which lead to increased rather than decreased
computer abuse incidents (Posey et al. 2011b). Therefore, I argue that increases in
internal ISP controls within organizations can be evaluated in terms of organizational
triggers. When organizations enforce an increased amount of ISP controls, the more ISP
pressure is expected to be perceived by the accountants. Hence I hypothesize:
H1c: An accountant’s perceived organizational ISP controls will be positively
associated with their perceived ISP stress.
Associations Between Elements of the Fraud
Triangle and Intentional ISP Violations
As discussed, although the fraud triangle has been extended to explain the
general dysfunctional behavior, beyond the typical fraudulent behavior, different
dysfunctional behaviors may make these three elements of the fraud triangle show
different importance in explanatory power. For intentional ISP violating behavior, I
emphasize the non-malicious and distinguish it from malicious ISP violating behaviors,
such as computer fraud, revealing confidential information to outsiders that may harm an
organization, writing viruses, and software piracy (D'Arcy et al. 2009; Siponen and
Vance 2010).
When comparing malicious dysfunctional behaviors (e.g., fraud) to
dysfunctional behaviors that are not illegal (i.e., not fraudulent), accountants may not act
in shareholders’ interest but cannot be committed by an outsider (Fiolleau et al. 2018). In
other words, the perceived opportunity for intentional ISP violations should be more
natural to identify rather than the opportunity for malicious ISP violations. For example,
accountants could easily violate the ISP to share passwords with other employees at little
to no cost. However, there are higher barriers for accountants to cross to copy sensitive
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personal company data and share this data with competitive companies (Fiolleau et al.
2018). Hence, I argue opportunities for intentional, but non-malicious ISP violations will
be easier to identify. In this condition, idealism and ISP pressure will emerge as two
direct factors that result in intentional ISP violations. High idealism means that
accountants believe that any technology-related action should maximize the good without
harming another (Forsyth 1980). Then even when an opportunity exists, an accountant
with high idealism will not intentionally violate the ISP because this behavior conflicts
with their values.
On the other hand, accounting employees’ stress will produce higher levels of
dysfunctional organizational behavior (Fogarty et al. 2000; Gaertner and Ruhe 1981;
Libby 1983). Therefore, high levels of ISP pressure will create motivations for an
accountant to utilize the opportunity to violate ISP for personal convenience. For the
opportunity itself, I argue the existence of an opportunity for an intentional ISP violation
will not be an essential condition that results in ISP violations. Therefore, based on the
discussion above, I hypothesize that:
H2a: An accountant’s perceived opportunity for ISP violations is not significantly
associated with intentional ISP violations.
H2b: An accountant’s idealism will be negatively associated with intentional ISP
violations.
H2c: An accountant’s perceived ISP stress will be positively associated with
intentional ISP violations.
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Moderating Effect of ISP Self-Efficacy
and Perceived Work Uncertainty
New global business models and the digital age have shifted expectations of the
work of accountants. Accounting employees have felt comfortable claiming job success
attributed to the level of specific technical skills acquired by the accountants (Rebele
1985). However, as society continues into the digital age, more academic studies have
shown that the accountants need to develop higher technological adaptability by
acquiring new IT skills and determining how new technologies should be best
incorporated into their accounting practices (Cory and Pruske 2012; Pan and Seow 2016;
Stanciu and Tinca 2016).
Self-efficacy is the belief that one has the capability to perform a particular
behavior (Bandura 1977). Self-efficacy perceptions have been found to influence
decisions about what behaviors to accept. Self-efficacy refers to the amount of effort and
persistence when individuals attempt to perform a specific behavior. The response to the
particular behavior may cause levels of stress and anxiety to the individual (Bandura
1977; Hackett and Betz 1981). Therefore, in the context of this research, information
security policy self-efficacy is defined as the belief that one can organize and execute
information security policies with success. It incorporates judgments of the ability to
apply technical skills to broader tasks (Compeau and Higgins 1995) (e.g., deciphering
technical jargon, applying needed encryption, analyzing what programs are needed).
Individuals with high ISP self-efficacy might perceive themselves as being able to
accomplish all regulated tasks required without assistance than those of lower judgments
of self-efficacy. Therefore, facing the same ISP controls, accountants with high ISP selfefficacy will have less ISP stress perception because they will believe they may be able to
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handle these ISP controls effectively (Gist and Mitchell 1992; Herath and Rao 2009;
Ifinedo 2012). As such I hypothesize:
H3a: An accountant’s ISP self- efficacy will negatively moderate the relationship
between ISP controls and perceived ISP stress.
The level of ISP controls within an organization will influence an accountant’s
ISP pressure, which will be the critical factor in their intent to violate ISPs. I argue there
will be two critical conditions (personal and environmental characteristics) for a
relationship between ISP controls and ISP pressure. The discussion above reflects the
personal characteristic.
The environmental characteristic of ISP compliance will be considered as the
work content and responsibility of a specific accountant’s position. Any changes in the
assigned work will mean changes with the corresponding ISP. For example, accountants
often face new accounting-rule changes, which will not only mean there will be new
accounting tasks to finish but also new ISP requirements to follow. Therefore, I consider
any work changes of an accountant as work uncertainty. Uncertainty has been identified
as an essential related variable because it makes managerial planning and effective
internal control more difficult (Duncan 1972; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Weick 1969).
For example, different facets of the organizations which face unpredictable change may
find that static budgets are ineffective control devices because the initial standards rapidly
become out of date. In the case of employees who anticipate more work uncertainty
(internal ISP changes), I expect that controls on existing ISP will cause more ISP
pressure because new ISPs may be added or an existing ISP may be modified. For
example, the evolving data breach notification laws and other security-based regulations
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(i.e., Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX]) and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act [HIPPA]) have imposed new encryption rules and authentication procedures for
accessing corporate systems (Chen et al. 2012; Kwon and Johnson 2013).
A consequence of these dynamic organizational security environment is that
employees are continually adjusting to new requirements with little chance to develop a
base of experience or assimilate security into their work routines. This uncertainty can be
unsettling for employees and cause higher stress. Recent research provides evidence that
changes within employees’ work environments (e.g., relationship strains and job
changes) relate to IT espionage and sabotage incidents (Shropshire 2009). Therefore, I
hypothesize:
H3b: An accountants’ perceived work uncertainty will positively moderate the
relationship between ISP controls and perceived ISP stress.
The resulting research model is illustrated in Figure 3-1.
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Methodology
I developed a two-time point survey. The first time point focuses on the responses
on ISP controls, three elements of the fraud triangle and two moderators (ISP selfefficacy and perceived work uncertainty) while the second time point contained the
instrumental climate measure. I intentionally separate the responses on ISP violations as
the dependent variable and responses on other constructs in this study in order to
eliminate the possibility of common method bias (Podsakoff et al. 2012). The data used
in this study was collected from a sample of full-time accounting professionals in the
U.S.
The measurement items in the questionnaire were adapted from existing validated
and well-tested scales in the extant literature. In addition to using previously validated
questions, all measures were pretested by two business professors with expertise in
survey research and ten professionals with ISP experience. The objective of the pretest
was to ensure that the measures were meaningful and they unambiguously captured the
domain of each construct. Based on detailed interviews with each professional,
appropriate changes were made to the measures. All measures were pilot tested in a
survey with a small portion of the targeted sample, which only resulted in minor wording
changes. I conducted a reliability analysis and exploratory factor analysis for each set of
measures. The validity and reliability of the adapted measures fulfilled the necessary
requirements, which indicated all measures were clear to the targeted samples, relevant,
and captured the intended concepts. The results placed sufficient confidence in the
measures to proceed with the survey administration of the target sample frame. All scales
used in the study are presented in Appendices. In the questionnaire, all items were
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measured with 5-point Likert scales, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly
agree.” These measures had been proved to have good validity and reliability.
In this study, the dependent variable is the respondent’s self-reported intention to
conduct intentional but non-malicious ISP violations. I adopted the work of Willison and
Warkentin (2013) of not changing passwords regularly, delayed security backup, and
bringing materials back home, as three specific examples of intentional but not malicious
ISP violations for respondents to accurately evaluate their intention. In particular, the
survey emphasized “not malicious” in each statement. Also, to avoid the social
desirability bias, there was no use of the “first-person perspective” but “third-person
perspective” for each statement to measure the ISP violating intention. The response
options ranged on a fully anchored scale from one to five, in which five served as
‘strongly agree’ with the statement that the respondent would engage in actions similar to
those of the hypothetical employee in the scenario under circumstances that represented
various levels of the antecedent variables.
For the organization, ISP controls, I used two items focusing on the “perceived
organizational ISP formal controls” to capture it, which are adapted from the work of
(Hsu et al. 2015). The ISP pressure in this study is considered as a second-order
construct, estimated using the factor scores of its three first-order dimensions as reflective
indicators, respectively ISP uncertainty, ISP complexity, and ISP overload (D'Arcy et al.
2014). ISP overload describes situations where ISP increases the workload for employees
and, as a result, creates added time pressure for them to complete job duties. ISP
complexity describes situations where ISP are viewed as complex and thereby forces
employees to expend time and effort in learning and understanding security measures.
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ISP uncertainty refers to contexts where the organization continually updates and changes
its job-related ISP.
For the ISP violation opportunity, I used the extent to which an accountant could
generally access the company’s computer resources without the authorization, using three
items adapted from (Pratt and Cullen 2000). Rationalization, as the final element of the
fraud triangle, has been measured by the individual’s level of idealism (Forsyth 1980),
which is also adopted and adapted as three items in this study. To evaluate the ISP selfefficacy, it was required of the respondents to report their capacity to complete their job
using technology and follow the ISP requirements, respectively in the condition of “no
one to tell them,” “only software manuals,” and “no prior software usage experience,”
which are adapted from the work of (Compeau and Higgins 1995). Finally, to measure
another moderator, perceived work uncertainty, I adopted the four items of (Colquitt et al.
2012) to evaluate the changes in their work situation and content.
To control the potential alternative explanation on the hypothesized relationship, I
considered the heterogeneity from the individual level and organizational level and also
measure them in this study. First, I consider the ISP training and education of the
accountants as two important individual characteristics to be controlled. Additionally, I
also consider two critical organizational characteristics, respectively, organizational
justice and organizational size (number of employees within the organization of the
respondent). The examination of the control variables and their influence on ISP violating
intentions revealed that none of these significantly influenced how employees may
formulate their intentions to commit an intentional ISP violation. In the questionnaire, all
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items were measured with 5-point Likert scales, ranging from “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree.”
I used a market research firm to invite full-time professional accountants to take
the survey. External panelists have been used increasingly in accounting IS research
(Ayyagari et al. 2011; Bulgurcu et al. 2010) and have certain advantages over traditional
methods that were key to this study. First, panels guarantee respondent anonymity and
thereby encourage honest responses to questions that may be subject to socially desirable
responses. Second, external panels contain respondents from a wide range of industries
and positions. The marketing research firm was instructed to collect responses from
employed computer-using accountant professionals. Respondents were paid $10 each for
participating in the study. In the questionnaire, the targeted samples were first asked to
indicate their computer experience in the company. If the participant did not use a
computer extensively as part of their daily work duties, that person was excluded from
further consideration. The questionnaire then asked the respondents to measure the
subjects’ perceptions of each research constructs.
A total of 574-panel members accepted the invitation to participate in the survey
by viewing the consent agreement and clicking past the first page. After excluding
incomplete responses, a total data set of 163 responses were included in all analyses.
Table 3-2 shows additional demographics for these respondents. Sample demographics
reveal that 57 percent were female and tended to be well-educated (72 percent with at
least a bachelor’s degree).
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Table 3-2
Sample Demographics
Respondents’
Gender
Male

Percentage
42.9%

Female

57.1%
ISO certification Percentage
Yes
No

41.7%
58.3%

Respondents’
Percentage
education
High school
15.3%
Technical
12.3%
Degree
College Degree 47.9%
Graduate
23.3%
Degree
Doctoral
1.2%
Degree

Work age

Percentage

<1 Year
1-5 Years

0.6%
28.2%

5-10 Years 30.7%
10-15 Years 12.9%
>15 Years

27.6%

Data Analysis and Results
Following the recommendations of Lowry and Gaskin (2014), there are reasons
for this study to employ the use of Partial Least Squares (PLS) for building and testing
the research model. First, PLS-based structural equation modeling (SEM) is easier for me
to process the second-order construct of ISP related stress. Second, PLS-SEM is a “silver
bullet” in this research situation when models are relatively complex and representative
sets of data are rather small (Lowry and Gaskin 2014; Ringle et al. 2012). By using PLS
estimation, the variance observed in the dependent variable can be maximized, which
conform to the study’s intention to identify the explanatory power of the fraud triangle on
the intentional violation behavior and further compare the relative importance of the
three-factors of the fraud triangle. Therefore, in my study, SmartPLS (version 2.0) was
the primary statistical tool to analyze the measurement and structural models.
The measurement model was tested by assessing both the convergent and
discriminant validity. Because the study viewed ISP stress as superordinate, second-order
constructs composed of multiple reflective, first-order dimensions, the validity of the
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reflective measures (three dimensions of ISP pressure) were also assessed. Validity was
assessed three ways. First, I assessed convergent validity, which is how each item was
related to its corresponding construct by examining the factor loadings. Convergent
validity is considered satisfactory if the factor loading of a measure is 0.7 or higher. All
factor loadings were above the cutoff point of 0.70 with a t-value higher than 1.96. The
measures loaded on their appropriate factors and there was no evidence of significant
cross-loading. Average variance extracted (AVE) was also examined to evaluate
convergent validity. AVE is greater than 0.5, establishing convergent validity. The results
in Table 2 show that each construct had an AVE greater than 0.5, which suggests that the
measures exhibited adequate convergent validity. Second, the reliability of the measures
was examined through two criteria, Cronbach’s alpha (CA) and composite reliability
(CR). The CA and CR of construct was greater than 0.7, a common threshold for
signifying satisfactory construct reliability. According to the results, the minimum CA
and CR values exceed the recommended threshold of 0.7, indicating acceptable reliability
of the measures. Third, discriminant validity is verified by the difference between the
AVE of a construct and its correlation with other constructs. For adequate discriminant
validity, the square roots of AVE of any construct should be greater than the correlations
between the construct and other constructs, which means that the diagonal elements
should be greater than corresponding off-diagonal ones (Fornell and Larcker 1981). As
per the results in Table 3-3, the criterion for discriminant validity was also met in this
study.
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Table 3-3
Descriptive Statistics, Correlations (Among Directly Observed Constructs) and Reliability

Constru
ct
ISP
Control
ISP
Oppo
Ideal
ISPU
ISPO
ISPC
WrkU

Mean(SD) 1

SE
IVI

3.14(1.05) -0.04
2.94(1.05) 0.22**

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

IVI

0.853
-0.12

0.896

2.48(0.93) 0.924
4.14(0.73) -0.23**

0.936

-0.23**
-0.06
0.40**
0.48**
0.36**

0.13
0.20**
-0.14
-0.16
-0.13

0.858
0.10
-0.19*
-0.28*
-0.21*

0.875
0.46**
0.35**
0.19*

0.892
0.70**
0.49**

0.890
0.51**

0.891

-0.01
-0.09

-0.11
-0.07

-0.05
0.1

-0.09
0.32**

-0.20*
0.35**

0.01
0.31**

4.36(0.73)
3.06(1.05)
2.26(1.02)
2.13(0.99)
2.62(1.13)

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; Diagonal elements (in bold) are the square root of the AVE; The offdiagonal elements are the correlations among the constructs; Oppo=opportunity; Ideal= Idealism;
ISPU=Information security policy uncertainty; ISPO= information security policy overload; ISPC=
information security policy complexity; WrkU= work uncertainty; SE= ISP self-efficacy; IVI=
Intentional ISP violation intention.

Common method variance (CMV) may have confounding effects on the observed
relationships between the predictors and criterion variables (Podsakoff et al. 2003).
Although the data was collected in two different phases with a two-week time difference
for independent and dependent variables, data were all rated by employees, and thereby
the potential CMV might not be removed completely. To further assess the potential
effects of common method bias, Harman’s single-factor test was conducted, and results
showed all of the items of constructs in the research model cannot be loaded in a single
factor in an EFA. In particular, no high correlation was found between the same marker
variables in time 1 and time 2. The marker variables have low and insignificant
correlations with all the studied constructs, while the partial correlations between the key
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constructs were high and significant. Both of Harman’s single factor test and marker
variables test make the study confident that common method bias won’t threaten the data
results.

Results of Structural Model
The structural model for the hypotheses test is also examined through Smart PLS
2.0. I followed the steps proposed by (Aiken and Stephen 1985; Aiken et al. 1991) to
examine the moderation hypotheses. The interaction terms were mean-centered before
creating the interaction variables in order to reduce the potential for collinearity (Chin et
al. 2003). Bootstrapping (1000 resamples) was used to determine the significance of the
path coefficients. The second-order ISP stressors were estimated using the factor scores
of their first-order dimensions as reflective indicators as seen in D’arcy et al (2014). The
results for the structural model are presented in Figure 3-2. The model explains 17% of
the variance of intentional ISP violation intention.
As shown in Figure 3-2, the organizational ISP controls will significantly reduce
the perceived ISP opportunity in the organization (β = -0.228, p < 0.01; H1a is
supported). On the other hand, the ISP controls will result in the higher ISP stress on the
accountants (β = 0.198, p < 0.01; H1c is supported). Surprisingly, my results revealed
the ISP controls will also reduce the idealism (β = -0.230, p < 0.05), therefore H1b is not
supported). This result may be explained by the subjective measurement on the idealism.
The high ISP controls perceived within an organization could have negatively impacted
an accountant’s perception of job autonomy (e.g. working remotely, high collaborative
environment). This effect can gradually lower an accountant’s resolve of idealism and
distort their cognition.

ISP Selfefficacy

-0.179**

0.916**

ISP
overload
Work
uncertainty

0.151*

0.198**

-0.230*

ISP
uncertainty

0.689**

R2=36.3%

(Second-order)

ISP stress

R2=5.3%

Idealism

R2=5.2%

Opportunity
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complexity

0.839**

0.287**

0.009

-0.042

R2=17%

ISP violation
intention

Figure 3-2. Structural Model Results

Notes: Paths in dash are not significant (p > 0.05). Non-significant control variables are not shown. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
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Among the three factors of the fraud triangle, only ISP related pressure is
significantly related to the intentional ISP violation intention (β = 0.287, p < 0.01. H2c is
supported). Both perceived ISP violating opportunity and idealism are not significantly
related to the intentional ISP violation intention. H2a and H2b aren’t supported in this
study. These results show that the ISP pressure will be the only important element in
fraud triangle to result in the ISP violation intention.
Finally, focusing two moderators on the effectiveness of the ISP controls on ISP
stress, the results show that the standard path coefficients of work uncertainty (β = 0.151,
p < 0.05) have positive and significant effect on ISP related pressure, which support the
hypotheses H3b. In addition, the moderating effect of ISP self-efficacy on the
relationship between ISP demands and ISP related stress is also significant (β = -0.180, p
< 0.01).

Discussion
I theorize ISP controls as one type of formal management control and
contextualize three elements of fraud triangle into accountant’s intentional ISP violating
behavior, respectively perceived ISP violating opportunity, accountants’ idealism, and
perceived ISP pressure. By linking accounting management controls and the fraud
triangle together, I further explain the dysfunctional behavior. I examined how the ISP
controls will influence the intentional ISP violating behavior via three elements of the
fraud triangle. Using 163 responses from accounting professionals, it revealed that ISP
controls did significantly influence the fraud triangle. ISP controls did indeed function
properly by reducing opportunities for ISP violations. However, the shortcoming of high
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levels of ISP controls created a lower sense of idealism and most importantly enhanced
an accountant’s perceived ISP pressure.
Among the three elements of the fraud triangle only ISP pressure was
significantly associated with the accountants’ intentional ISP violating behavior.
Furthermore, ISP pressure was the only effective element to transfer the effect of
organizational ISP controls to the ISP violation intention. I also examine the conditional
effect of ISP self-efficacy as a personal characteristic and work uncertainty as an
environmental characteristic on the relationship between ISP control and ISP pressure.
Results show that high ISP self-efficacy will effectively reduce the ISP stress from ISP
controls, but high work uncertainty will increase this pressure perception. These findings
provide important contributions to the accounting literature and accounting employee
management practice as follows.

Implications for the Accounting Literature and Future Research
First, this study to the best of my knowledge is the first to examine the newly
emerging intentional ISP violation behaviors of accountants in the extant accounting
literature.
Second, it contributes to accounting management controls literature by using the
fraud triangle to explain the side effect of ISP controls on intentional ISP violating
behavior. Previous accounting management control research has observed that formal
controls can negatively affect the attitudes and behavior of employees subjected to the
control (Christ 2013). Given that organizations cannot operate effectively without formal
control mechanisms, it is important to the literature to expand the understanding of
specific characteristics of controls that may elicit a negative response from employees so
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organizations can limit these unintended consequences (Christ 2013; Enzle and Anderson
1993). In this study, I further identified and confirmed ISP pressure as the key factor to
explain the side effect of organizational ISP controls on the intentional violating intention
of accounting employees.
Third, this study contributes to the fraud triangle framework by examining its
antecedents and extends its application in ISP violating behavior, beyond the fraud
behavior known as wrongful criminal intentional deception for personal gain involving a
violation of trust (Ramamoorti 2008). Dorminey et al. (2012) and Fiolleau et al. (2018)
have called for the application of fraud triangle into general dysfunctional behavior,
especially non-malicious behavior, and implied the different importance of three
elements of the fraud triangle on explaining different, specific dysfunctional behavior. I
confirmed this notion and empirically revealed that ISP pressure should be a dominant
factor in explaining the specific dysfunctional behavior--intentional ISP violating
intention, compared to another two elements (ISP violating opportunity and idealism).
Finally, I also contribute to the accounting stress literature by borrowing one new
type of pressure, which is SRS, from IS literature. Although multiple sources of stress
have been considered in existing accounting literature, such as the acronym M.I.C.E (M:
money; I: ideology; C: coercion; E: ego) (Kranacher and Riley 2019), ISP pressure is
rarely considered in the accounting studies. This study confirmed the role of ISP pressure
in explaining the intentional ISP violating behavior. In addition, the supported link (ISP
controls—ISP pressure—Intentional ISP violations) in this study is also consistent to the
accounting stress model (Libby 1983). The task demands and management controls did
result in accounting employees to perceive higher levels of stress causing increments or
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decrements in cognitive performance (i.e. higher levels of ISP pressure resulting in
intentional ISP violating behavior) Around this new type, stress, I further identify high
work uncertainty and low ISP self-efficacy as possible explanations for the high ISP
pressure of accountants when facing high levels of controls.

Implications for Practice
The findings also have important implications for practice as well. First,
accounting managers should notice the side effect of organizational ISP controls.
Although it’s taken for granted that high controls will offer little to no opportunity for the
dysfunctional behaviors, the findings showed that ISP violating opportunity is always
high in the organization and more importantly it shows no direct effect on the ISP
violating intention.
In contrast, the higher ISP controls will motivate the accountants’ intentional ISP
violating behavior by increasing their ISP pressure. Therefore, managers should make a
careful balance to achieve the “perfect mix” of controls. Second, accounting managers
should also take a hard look at their ISPs to understand the limitations the ISPs have
created for their accountants. Accounting professionals have been characterized as a
high-pressure position. Therefore, any new source of stress should be carefully
considered. Finally, accounting managers should also notice the difference between
illegal/malicious behavior and intentional but non-malicious behavior of accountants.
Increased ISP controls in the context of illegal/malicious behavior may be beneficial
since they reduce opportunity.
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Limitations
There are also some limitations to the research methodology in this study. First, the
results may still contain the social desirability bias, especially by using the self-reporting
way to measure idealism and intentional ISP violating intention. Several steps were taken
to overcome this issue including “third-person perspective” in the measuring statement and
two-time point research design. Second, the findings in this study are based on a relatively
small sample (163 accounting professionals). Therefore, careful consideration should be
taken before generalizing the findings of this study. Third, future studies may benefit by
expanding on the types of rationalization an accounting employee may undergo when faced
with the decision to act upon dysfunctional employee behaviors. In this study, idealism
may not have given researchers and practitioners alike a full picture of what ethics may do
for accounting employees. Finally, although ISP violations were conceptualized as general
violations, future researchers could further examine specific intentional ISP violating
behavior, such as sharing passwords with colleagues, to obtain more contextualized but
insightful findings.

Conclusion
In focusing on explaining how ISP controls influence intentional ISP violating
behavior as a newly emerging behavior of accountants, I utilized the fraud triangle in this
research setting to connect the ISP organizational control to the three legs of the fraud
triangle for dysfunctional behavior to occur: opportunity (ISP violating opportunity in
this study), pressure (ISP stress), and attitude/rationalization (idealism). The results show
that ISP controls did reduce the ISP violating opportunity but meanwhile increased the
ISP stress. However, the opportunity for ISP violations did not directly change the
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violating behavior, but instead ISP stress will contribute to higher ISP violating intention.
These findings show the side effect of ISP controls on ISP pressure. By incorporating
personal (ISP-self efficacy) and environmental characteristics (work-uncertainty), my
study reveals these factors will, in fact, impact an accounting employee’s level of ISP
pressure. ISP-self efficacy can be improved through extensive training and may help
accounting employees relieve some of the ISP pressure. Organizations can monitor the
levels of work uncertainty throughout an organization to reduce accounting employee’s
ISP pressure, which inevitably leads to an ISP violation.
ISP controls are an essential component of an organization’s information security
management. All organizations endeavor to safeguard and monitor sensitive and financial
company data. Information security management is a multifaceted task. Governing
accounting employees effectively helps organizations achieve this complex task. This
study opens up one new avenue for future researchers to extend the application of the
fraud triangle in general dysfunctional behavior and considers ISP pressure as one new
type of source of pressure placed upon accountants.

CHAPTER 4

ESSAY 3: EXAMINING ACCOUNTING EMPLOYEES
INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY STRESS:
INSIGHTS FROM THE JUSTICE AND
RESPONSIBILITY RATIONALIZATION
Introduction
A recent wall street journal article suggested that 29% of CEOs discussed having
their organization fall victim to information technology (IT) security fraud (Cutter 2018).
As information technology brings unprecedented advances in communication for all
users, including accounting employees, it also offers greater reach for criminal activities
(Hu et al. 2011; Moody et al. 2018; Straub Jr and Nance 1990; Willison and Warkentin
2013). There are a variety of sources of threats to accounting information systems. Some
common examples include but are not limited to: unauthorized access that allows for
employees to alter, delete, corrupt, destroy, or steal data, failure to maintain backup files,
and theft or misuse of computers resulting in damages to the reputation of the
organization. To address this IT security threat, organizations have devoted significant
resources towards behavioral security measures, such as information security policy (ISP)
development and education and training, in addition to continually updating their security
technologies (Willison and Warkentin 2013; Willison et al. 2018). However, these IT
security response measures fuel already stressed and over-worked employees by
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demanding they comply with additional security regulations (D’Arcy and Teh 2019).
Therefore, unsurprisingly, despite an organization's best efforts to prevent
employee-related IT threats using multiple ISPs, there are a class of employee securityrelated violation behaviors known as voluntary ISP violations (D'Arcy et al. 2014) (e.g.,
password sharing, sharing insider information, unauthorized usage) that continue to
plague organizations. ISP stress (security-related stress due to ISP requirement) is the
critical element on employees' ISP violations (D'Arcy et al. 2014; D’Arcy and Teh 2019);
however, there has been a lack of theoretical explanation offered to explain how ISP
stress affects ISP violations of accounting employees. In this study, I attempt to provide
insight into research that fills this gap.
From a theoretical perspective, the fraud triangle theory is unique to the
accounting intentional fraud realm, which can be extended to examine accounting
employees' intentional ISP violation behavior. The three factors that make up the fraud
triangle are (1) opportunity, (2) pressure, and (3) rationalization. The opportunity arises
for intentional fraud when there is an absence of controls, ineffective controls, or the
ability to override controls. Work stress or environmental stress may exert pressure or
provide an incentive for employees to commit fraud. Rationalization is an attitude or state
of mind that allows an individual to make a conscious decision to use to use any means to
present fraudulent or misrepresented information for a personal gain (e.g., asset
misappropriations, fraud) (Carcello and Hermanson 2008; Murphy and Dacin 2011).
Studies in the accounting literature have found that the three dimensions of the fraud
triangle are all critical in explaining the likelihood of fraudulent behavior in accounting
literature.
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Nevertheless, despite this widespread circulation of the fraud triangle theory, it
has also been the subject of considerable debate and criticism in recent years on the equal
weights of the three elements in different contexts (Free 2015; Murphy and Free 2015).
The fraud triangle suggests that the perpetrator has a non-sharable problem that is
grounded in pressure, and when aligned with opportunity and rationalization, an
otherwise "good" citizen succumbs to committing fraud known as the accidental fraudster
(Ramamoorti et al. 2009). On the other hand, a predator is better organized and will have
devised more complex concealment schemes. The predator naturally is better prepared to
deal with auditors and other oversight mechanisms (Kranacher and Riley 2019;
Kranacher and Stern 2004). The predator modifies the functional fraud triangle
antecedents: pressure and rationalization are not necessary, and the sole element is the
opportunity (Dorminey et al. 2010; Lokanan 2015). Therefore, the relative importance of
the three elements of the fraud triangle depends on the context of the violation. In this
study, I do not assume the accounting employees are "predators" but "accidental
fraudsters" when committing ISP violation. The key elements for accidental fraudsters
are pressure and rationalization. Therefore, in this study, I argue that pressure and
rationalization will be the two key elements to explain the accountants' ISP violation
intention, especially when considering the rationalization as a potential mechanism to
explain the effect of pressure on the intentional ISP violation of accounting employees.
Information security literature has suggested the importance of employees'
cognitive appraisal of stress and their coping strategies, such as rationalization, on their
ISP violation behaviors (D'Arcy et al. 2014). The theoretical foundation for the
rationalization construct comes from the moral disengagement theory, which argues that
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the crucial precondition for managers to act opportunistically is due to the ability to
disengage moral responsibility from their action by self-justifying the action to make it
compatible with moral standards (Bandura 1990; Bandura 1999). Accounting researchers
have noticed the imperative role of the rationalization element of fraud triangle in the
context of accounting behavior research (Chong and Wang 2019; Murphy 2012; Murphy
and Dacin 2011; Murphy and Free 2015). For example, concerning rationalizing fraud,
Murphy and Dacin (2011) identified the following seven categories of rationalizations as
(1) moral justification, by reconstruing an act as being morally worthy, (2) advantageous
comparison, by comparing the act to something worse, (3) euphemistic labeling, or using
convoluted language to make the act look better than it is, (4) minimize, ignore, or
misconstrue the consequences of the act, (5) denial of or blaming the victim, (6)
displacing responsibility by blaming someone else, and (7) diffusing responsibility, by
blaming everyone else. In my study, I focus on the role of displacing responsibility and
diffusing responsibility share the common theme of shifting responsibility to others;
previous research conceptualized them together as “responsibility rationalization” (Chong
and Wang 2019). Using the responsibility rationalization, I use this justification for
unethical behavior (i.e., intentional ISP violations).
In this study, the displacement of responsibility specifically refers to attributing
personal responsibility to an authority figure. Individuals use this cognitive mechanism to
avoid responsibility by attributing his/her responsibility to an authority figure, such as a
manager or superior. The individual can shift the 'feeling' of being 'responsible' or
'accountable' from an autonomous state to an agentic state. This psychological shift
results in the individual feeling no responsibility for his or her action because any
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unfavorable consequence can transfer back to the authority figure (e.g., My boss told me
to do it) (Detert et al. 2008). In the context of this study, accounting employees engaging
in the displacement of responsibility may argue they are merely following instructions
from their superiors and therefore are not accountable for their decisions regarding ISP
violations.
In contrast, diffusion of responsibility refers to attributing personal responsibility
to others. This mechanism allows an individual to avoid the responsibility of accepting
the unfavorable consequences of behaviors by dispersing blame among his or her peers.
Consequently, individuals engaging in such diffusion will have little concern for the
consequences of their decision even if it will be harmful to the organization (Mynatt and
Sherman 1975). Diffusion of responsibility exists when people believe the harm
associated with an undesirable act is attributed to many people. Therefore, it keeps any
one person from feeling personally responsible (Bonner et al. 2016). For example, one
easy way to diffuse responsibility is to argue that 'everyone does it!' (McKimmie et al.
2003). In the context of my study, 'everyone' refers to other accountants in the
organization. Accounting employees engaging in the diffusion of responsibility may feel
their obligation is diluted or weakened when their responsibility or blame is perceived to
be shared with all other accountants and employees in the organization. Rather than
feeling personally responsible, these accounting employees may argue they are not at
fault because other accountants can also cause the consequence of intentional ISP
violations in the organization.
In order to understand the effect of ISP pressure on accountants and their ISP
violation behaviors, I investigate whether or not the ISP pressure will impact accounting
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employees’ intentional ISP violation behavior through responsibility rationalization. I
predict that, when faced with ISP pressure, the ability to rationalize will provide
accountants with a legitimate excuse for their wrongdoing or unethical behaviors such as
an intentional ISP violation (Bies and Shapiro 1987; Snyder 1985; Wood and Mitchell
1981). To further examine the elements of rationalization, I argue that perceptions of
organizational justice will influence rationalization as an important motivational factor to
violate trust against the organization (Rae et al. 2008). Therefore, in this study, I further
explore how the perceived justice of an organization during an ISP implementation could
be an important condition for the employees to choose the target they blame. Perceived
justice will provide situation-based influences on individual cognition and behaviors
(Rupp et al. 2014). Therefore, accounting employees can further decide how to
rationalize the responsibility towards their ISP intentional violations.
Organizational justice research examines various motivators that may lead to
employees’ perceptions of justice or injustice. Scholars have identified four dimensions
of perceived organizational justice – distributive, procedural, informational, and
interactional (Colquitt et al. 2001). Previous investigations of negative outcomes of
perceived organizational justice have provided theoretical evidence featuring distributive
and procedural injustice perceptions as driving motivations for undesirable employee
behavior (Colquitt et al. 2001). In contrast, informational and interactional injustice
perceptions explain employees' negative behavior after the undesirable action has been
taken.
Since the focal phenomenon of this study is intentional ISP violation behavior, I
focus only on two types of perceived justice, distributive justice, and procedural justice to
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further understand possible antecedents to ISP violation behavior. Distributive justice
focuses on whether the allocation of benefits and costs within a group should be
proportional to the contributions of group members (Greenberg 1990; Greenberg and
Folger 1983). In the context of my study, after organizations enforce their ISPs, the
employees will make a judgment on whether the increment in the security of their
computer and data is worth the inconvenience or other loss they may suffer from ISP
compliance. If the inconvenience (disturbs the work of employees and reduces their work
efficiency) that is perceived by the employees is found to be greater than the actual
benefits (rewards), then accountants will perceive distributive injustice. This perception
will cause employees to blame the organization or managers for unreasonable ISPs,
which will result in ISP violations.
In contrast, procedural fairness has been referred to as the judgments about the
fairness of the "rules and processes" (Greenberg and Folger 1983) to be objectively
designed and applied. In the context of this study, I examine how individual accounting
employees will judge whether the ISPs are applied to all accounting employees of the
organization. If procedures for detecting and punishing ISP violation behaviors do not
appear to be reasonable, then accounting employees may perceive procedural injustice
within the organization. This reaction will further cause the accounting employee to use
the justification that other employees are not required to follow the ISP for rationalizing
their violating behaviors.
In this study, I expect low perceived distributive justice will enable accounting
employees to adapt to the displacement responsibility. The displacement will place the
blame on the organization or manager who causes their ISP pressure, causing employees
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to rationalize their violating behavior further. In contrast, high perceived procedural
justice will deprive the employee of adapting the diffusion responsibility therefore unable
to blame their colleagues who cause their ISP pressure and further rationalizes their
violating behavior. Thus, the second goal of this study is to investigate whether
organizational justice will reduce the magnitude of effects from ISP pressure on
accounting employees’ responsibility rationalization.
I utilize the fraud triangle in this research setting to connect the theory of moral
disengagement to the rationalization leg of the triangle. My research design expands on
the understanding of rationalization in an individual and how rationalization impacts
intentional ISP violation behavior. I also find evidence to explain how the ISP pressure
will influence the ISP violation through rationalization.
Based on the analysis of 154 usable responses from professional accountants, I
found displacement of responsibility and diffusion of responsibility are two significant
types of responsibility rationalization that mediated the relationship between ISP pressure
and intentional ISP violation behaviors. The findings verify the conditional effect of
organizational justice in reducing the displacement or diffusion of ISP responsibility.
These results contribute to prior accounting and ISP literature by (1) extending the
responsibility rationalization into the ISP violation behavior; (2) extending the fraud
triangle theory by considering the relationship between the pressure element (ISP stress)
and the rationalization elements (two types of responsibility rationalization); (3)
elaborating the mixed effect between two organizational justice stances and two types of
responsibility rationalization on ISP stress, which bridges the connection between the
organizational justice and fraud triangle theory. This research addresses several calls to
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expand current accounting literature's understanding of the role of rationalizations in
accountants' behaviors (Beasley et al. 2009; Bierstaker et al. 2009). My research also
provides theoretical groundwork necessary to explore interventions (i.e., procedural
justice and organizational justice) that reduce the harmful effects of rationalization on ISP
violation behaviors (Wells 2002; Wells 2017).

Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development
Stress itself is a complex concept that has been operationalized in terms of
stimulating conditions (i.e., events impacting on the person) that produce stress reactions
(Lazarus and Folkman 1984). Transactional stress models emphasize the cognitive
aspects of the stress process wherein stress models view stress as part of a series of
dynamic and complex interactions between an individual and the environment. Events
must be appraised as stressful before they can influence an individual's psychological
well-being (Daniels and Guppy 1997). An individual’s stress level rises and falls as a
result of assigning meaning to environmental stressors (Everly and Sobelman 1987).
Excessive stress intensity manifests in individuals in both physical and psychological
ways that lead to stress-related dysfunctional behavior. Conversely, the application of an
effective coping strategy will restore an individual to equilibrium.
In IS literature, two types of IT related stresses had been identified, which are
techno-stress and security-stress. Researchers have used the term techno-stress to
describe the end-user stress caused by accelerating technology demands in the workplace
(Ayyagari et al. 2011; Tarafdar et al. 2010; Weil and Rosen 1997). The term ISP securityrelated stress is used to describe the stressful demands imposed explicitly by security
requirements. For example, routinely scheduled security maintenance tasks can
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inconveniently disrupt an employee’s work schedule. ISP stress is a form of
psychological stress. Internal and external security-related demands can cause ISP stress,
which can be taxing on one’s cognitive resources and abilities. With rapid advances in
technology as well as increasing changes in security requirements creates conditions that
lead to ISP stress (D'Arcy et al. 2014; Tarafdar et al. 2010). In many cases, the
accounting information system technology has been developed faster than advances in
control practices and employees’ knowledge, skills, awareness, and compliance (AbuMusa 2006). In fact in practice and academia, accounting and financial publications warn
against computer-related data errors, producing false financial statements, violations of
internal controls, theft, burglaries, and internal sabotage (Balakrishnan et al. 2019; Gao
and Zhang 2019; Hartman et al. 1997; Nickerson 2019).
The primary outcome variable in workplace stress studies has been a measure of
employee performance in the accounting literature. In this study’s security-related
context, this performance measure is intentional ISP violations. An ISP is defined as a
statement of the roles and responsibilities of the employees to safeguard the information
and technology resources of their organization (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). Therefore in my
study, an ISP violation is defined as any act by an accounting employee that is against the
established ISP of the organization (D'Arcy et al. 2014; Hu et al. 2012). I focus on
intentional ISP violations instead of non-intentional violation behaviors. Consistent with
existing security compliance research and to a degree driven by the difficulty to obtain
actual ISP violation instances, I focus on ISP violation intention rather than actual
behavior (Moody et al. 2018; Siponen et al. 2010). Many ISP violations are not readily
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observable or objectively measureable; furthermore, organizations are often reluctant to
disclose violation behavior to researchers (Guo et al. 2011).
As a first step, I use the fraud triangle, which is a well-known conceptual
framework for understanding the drivers of fraud. In this study, I extend the fraud triangle
theory to examine the possibility of reducing accounting employees’ dysfunctional ISP
violation behavior (Albrecht et al. 1995; Morales et al. 2014). In Cressey’s (1953)
seminal work, he identifies three conditions that must be present for fraud to occur:
opportunity, motivation, and rationalization. Opportunity is the perception that the fraud
may be perpetrated undetected. Motivation reflects the pressure or need to benefit from
fraud. Rationalization is the justification of the fraud in a way that mitigates any
inconsistency between the action and expectations of the behavior. Professional standards
encourage auditors to frame their risk assessments using the fraud triangle (i.e., SAS
99/AU Sec 316, AICPA 2002).
Prior research encourages the use of the fraud triangle as a basis for making risk
assessments and identifies the importance of all three of its dimensions in influencing an
individual’s propensity to commit fraud (Bell and Carcello 2000; Murphy 2012; Peecher
1996; Rezaee 2005). While fraud is wrongful criminal intentional deception for personal
gain involving a violation of trust (Ramamoorti 2008; Ramamoorti and Olsen 2007),
dysfunctional behaviors occur when individuals knowingly make a choice that puts their
interests before that of the organization (Cohen et al. 2007). When accounting employees
engage in dysfunctional behavior this increases the risk of financial and reputational harm
to an organization. Rationalization requires a clear development of self-interest beyond
economic factors to include the preservation of one’s moral self-identity. The
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psychological justification allows individuals to excuse dysfunctional behaviors (Frank
1988). More specifically, rationalization includes a definition of ethical behavior or
explanation of how an ethical person can perform a particular behavior (i.e. intentional
ISP violations). Rationalization incorporates the justification of how a particular behavior
can be defended as ethical before, during, or after its enactment. Even if emotions serve
to keep individuals honest, many individuals experience cognitive dissonance reduction
when choosing to partake in misreporting behavior (Chong and Monroe 2015; Chong and
Wang 2019; Frank 1988; Murphy and Dacin 2011; Sykes and Matza 1957). Consistent
with previous research, I present rationalization as a mechanism of coping strategy.
Literature has shown that when faced with stress/pressure, an individual will
engage in some effective coping strategy to restore physical and psychological balance
(Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Rodell and Judge 2009; Sutherland and Cooper 2000). In
this study, when accounting employees face more ISP stress due to more ISP
requirements, they will deploy more responsibility rationalization as a coping strategy to
disengage themselves from the responsibility of violations. I consider both the
displacement of responsibility and the diffusion of responsibility. Displacement of
responsibility refers to attributing personal responsibility to an authority figure. This
cognitive mechanism allows an individual to avoid responsibility by attributing his/her
own responsibility for their action onto others, such as senior team members or managers.
By doing this, the individual can shift the feeling of being responsible or accountable
from an autonomous state to an agentic state (Bandura et al. 1996). The diffusion of
responsibility refers to attributing personal responsibility to others. This mechanism
allows an individual to avoid the responsibility of accepting the unfavorable
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consequences of behaviors by dispersing blame among his/her peers (Bandura et al.
1996). Individuals engaging in the diffusion of responsibility rationalization will not be
deterred by the consequences of their decisions (Mynatt and Sherman 1975).
Putting these rationalization types in the context of my study, I argue accounting
personnel have the reputation of facing a high-pressure job (Collins and Killough 1992;
Gaertner and Ruhe 1981) and their job performance is highly dependent on the extent to
which they complete their assigned work. Because of this, they have limited personal
resources and mental energy to comply with extra overloaded ISP requirements.
Therefore, high ISP pressure will quickly force the employees to conclude they are
violating the ISP to make sure they can finish their own assigned work required by the
supervisor in time. This reasoning will further lead them to attribute responsibility for
violations to the organizations or managers because the supervisor or organization has
deployed an unreasonable workload on them. This justification becomes the displacement
of responsibility to cope with the ISP pressure. Perceptions of high ISP pressure given by
the organization will also motivate collective violation behavior (Greenberg and Folger
1983; Willison et al. 2018). In other words, if accounting employees perceive high levels
of ISP stress, the more likely they will infer that other accounting employees will also
conduct intentional ISP violations. This implication will further lead them to attribute
their responsibility to other employees. This justification becomes the diffusion
responsibility for coping with ISP stress. Per the arguments presented above, I present the
following hypotheses:
H1: Information Security Policy (ISP) pressure will be significantly associated
with two forms of responsibility rationalization, specifically:
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H1a: ISP pressure will be positively associated with the displacement of
responsibility.
H1b: ISP pressure will be positively associated with the diffusion of
responsibility.
Individuals use generally accepted moral standards to self-regulate their behavior.
Moral disengagement theory offers a theoretical lens to examine the psychological cost
(i.e. self-condemnation) when violating these moral standards (Bandura 1990; Bandura
1999; Bandura et al. 1996). However, individuals may still engage in behavior that
violates the moral standards since individuals will be able to disengage themselves.
Speciﬁcally, this psychological self-regulatory mechanism does not function unless it is
activated. Individuals can choose to deactivate their self-regulatory mechanisms by
rationalizing their behavior to defend their deviation from morally acceptable behavior
(Abelson et al. 1968; Bandura 1999; Shu et al. 2009). In other words, people do not
ordinarily engage in undesirable employee conduct unless they have justified the morality
of their actions. Moral disengagement theory helps explain part of the perplexing
observation that most individuals perceive themselves as moral but unethical behavior
(e.g. tax evasion, asset misappropriation) commonly occurs (Bersoff 1999; Clotfelter
1983; Steele 1988).
The moral disengagement process is theorized to play a critical role in explaining
how humans can engage in corporate misconduct without apparent cognitive distress
(Brief et al. 2001; Moore 2008). The displacement and diffusion of responsibility
mechanisms allow the employee to obscure their moral standards. Displacement of
responsibility refers to how individuals may designate responsibility to authority figures
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who may have indirectly condoned or deliberately engaged in their behavior (Kelman and
Hamilton 1989; Sykes and Matza 1957). The diffusion of responsibility works similarly
but refers to dispersing responsibility for one’s actions across members of an organization
rather than just a single authoritative figure (Vaughan 1996).
Therefore, I argue that accounting employees with lower responsibility
rationalization will generally be less likely to intentionally violate ISPs than individuals
with higher responsibility rationalization. This is because the former are less able to
rationalize the feeling of being personally accountable for the potentially harmful effects
of their ISP violation. Accounting employees with lower responsibility rationalization
will all be less able to neutralize their feelings of discomfort when intentionally violating
an ISP.
However, these individuals should not be assumed to never engage in unethical
behavior (i.e. ISP violations) Research suggests that individuals will weigh the benefits of
their gains against the mental costs of choosing to engage in unethical behavior (Luft
1997). The psychological costs are influenced by their personal feelings of guilt,
discomfort, or the consequences of lying (Gneezy 2005; Mayhew and Murphy 2014;
Murphy 2012). If individuals believe that the benefits gained from unethical conduct
outweigh the personal costs, then they are more likely to engage in unethical behavior
(i.e. ISP violations).
Rationalization is the process an individual undergoes to characterize an act in a
way that allows them to preserve their ethical persona. Individuals tend to regard
themselves as virtuous people and attempt not to engage in behaviors that may conflict
with this self-concept (Ramamoorti 2008). Individuals usually prefer to believe they are
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rule-abiding and will self-govern their behaviors to continue to maintain a positive view
of themselves (Aronson 1999; Bosse and Phillips 2016). Rationalization enables
individuals to behave in ways that might otherwise be considered unethical and
cognitively justify their behavior (Elliot and Devine 1994; Ramamoorti 2008).
Based upon the above discussion, I propose the following hypotheses：
H2: Two types of responsibility rationalizations processes will be significantly
associated with intentional ISP violation intention, specifically:
H2a: Displacement of responsibility will be positively related to the intentional
ISP violation intention.
H2b: Diffusion of responsibility will be positively related to the intentional ISP
violation intention.
People’s perception of truth and fairness depends on whether it is clear to them
and others what is true or false, fair or unfair. Accounting information systems within
organizations can reinforce or dissipate the perception of fairness. There is considerable
evidence that employees’ perception of fairness will play an important role when making
business-related decisions (Colquitt et al. 2003). Fairness perceptions drive both
consumer and producer behaviors (Kahneman et al. 1986; Piron and Fernandez 1995).
However, employees are hesitant to engage in corporate misconduct (i.e. theft) if they
perceive they are harming individual managers (Greenberg 2002). Therefore if
management accounting researchers ignored considerations of fairness within
organizations there would be an incomplete description of management accountingrelated behavior (Luft 1997).

96
Managerial control systems literature implicitly recognizes that monetary rewards
will not be the singular motivation for employees to work in the organization’s best
interest. Research has examined the use of culture controls, codes of conduct, screening
for quality personnel, and “tone at the top” as supplements to govern accounting
employees' organizational behavior (Davis and Militello 1994; Merchant and Otley 2006;
Simons 1994). Furthermore, perceptions of fairness must be heavily considered as the
outcome may affect financial reporting judgments (Evans III et al. 2001; Libby 2001).
Individual perceptions of organizational justice can influence co-workers, superiors, and
the compliance towards policies of the organization (Colquitt et al. 2001; Leventhal et al.
1980; Li et al. 2014; Willison et al. 2018). In my study, I argue that organizations need to
examine perceptions of fairness within an organization as a possible motivator of
unwanted ISP violations.
Organizational justice refers to perceptions of organizational fairness. These
perceptions manifest in four specific ways; distributive, procedural, interactional, and
informational (Colquitt et al. 2001; Greenberg 1987). Interactional justice is the
perceived fairness of the treatment received in the explanation of formal procedures (Bies
and Shapiro 1987). In other words, interactional justice reflects employees’ feelings of
how fairly managers treat them. Informational justice refers to fairness in the
communication process of formal company procedures (Colquitt et al. 2001). For
example, an employee’s perception of the candidness of a supervisor’s communication
would reflect informational justice. Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of
outcomes (Colquitt et al. 2003). Procedural justice is the perceived fairness of the process
(e.g., policies and procedures and their enactments) of determining outcomes or resource
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distributions (Colquitt et al. 2001). In this study, formal procedure refers to a company’s
rules, regulations, or policies that precisely guide an organization’s information security
management.
In my study, I focus on distributive and procedural justice rather than
informational and interactional justice since research has shown greater distributive and
procedural fairness is assumed to coincide with greater organizational justice (Lee 2001).
Distributive justice is conceptualized as the perceived fairness of the ISP required by the
managers of the organization. Employees are concerned about the fairness of outcomes in
terms of whether complying with organizational ISP will result in higher rewards in
proportion to costs they expend when following ISPs (Adams 1965; Leventhal et al.
1980; Willison et al. 2018). Procedural justice represents the perceived fairness of the
process used to arrive at outcomes, which is conceptualized as the perceived fairness of
ISP requirements allocated among the employees within one organization. Employees
judge the fairness of processes used to determine outcomes in terms of whether ISPs are
consistent, unbiased, accurate, and ethical (Leventhal et al. 1980; Thibaut and Walker
1975).
Attribution theory states that individuals will search for causes of specific
outcomes and attribute causes to behavior in order to maintain their own positive selfimage (Weiner 1985). In this study, the ISP pressure can be considered an outcome of an
employee’s work circumstances. Accounting employees will then make a fairness
judgment in order to assess who and what caused this intentional ISP violation outcome
(Folger and Cropanzano 1998). Specifically, accounting employees will assess whether
the organization or other employees are accountable for their current work situation.

98
In this study, I argue when low distributive justice is perceived, it means the ISP
distributed by the organizations or managers is unreasonable. When accounting
employees perceive low distributive justice, this perception will enable accounting
employees to blame their managers or organization (i.e., displacement of responsibility
mechanism). On the other hand, when accounting employees perceive a higher
distributive justice it will decrease the effect of ISP pressure faced by the employee.
Accounting employees will be less likely to engage in the process of displacement
responsibility.
In the context of my study when low procedural justice is perceived, it means that
some employees who violated an ISP did not receive the punishment outlined by the
organization. This perception will allow employees to rationalize their violating behavior
easily. Therefore, the lower the procedural justice in an organization will increase the
effect of the ISP pressure faced by the employees easily allowing accounting employees
to engage in a diffusion of responsibility.
Prior research shows other corporate misconduct (i.e., embezzlement, financial
misreporting) is rationalized by employees as appropriate behavior when employees feel
the employer is not considered fair (Greenberg 1990; Greenberg 2002; Murphy 2012).
Rather than deterring others from committing unethical acts, employees who feel
mistreated will more likely conduct similar undesirable acts to correct their perceptions of
inequity (Hollinger and Clark 1983). The perception of fairness of authorities and coworkers has been an essential factor when examining accounting employees' behavior
(Zhang 2008). Therefore, based on the discussion above, I propose the following
hypotheses:
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H3a: Perceived distributive justice will negatively moderate the effect of ISP
pressure on the displacement of responsibility.
H3b: Perceived procedural justice will negatively moderate the effect of ISP
pressure on the diffusion of responsibility.
The resulting research model is illustrated in Figure 4-1.

Displacement of
responsibility
Distributive
justice

H3a-

H2a+
H1a+

ISP pressure
Procedural
justice

H3b-

H1+

Intentional
ISP violation
intention

H1b+
H2b+
Diffusion of
responsibility

Control variables:
Opportunity;

SETA;
Education,
Organization Size;
ISP self-efficacy

Figure 4-1: Research Model

Methodology
Measurement
The measurement items in my questionnaire were adapted from existing validated
and well-tested scales in the extant literature. In addition to using previously validated
questions, all measures were pretested by two business professors with expertise in
survey research and ten professionals with ISP experience. The objective of the pretest
was to ensure that the measures were meaningful and that they unambiguously captured
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the domain of each construct. Based on detailed interviews with each professional
pretester, appropriate changes were made to the measures.
All measures were pilot tested in a survey with a small portion of targeted
samples, which only resulted in minor wording changes. I conducted a reliability analysis
and exploratory factor analysis for each set of measures. The validity and reliability of
the adapted measures fulfilled the basic requirements, which indicated all measures were
clear to the targeted samples, relevant and captured the intended concepts. The data used
in this study were collected from a sample of full-time professional accountants working
in U.S. organizations.
The results placed sufficient confidence in the measures to proceed with the
survey administration of the target sample frame. In the questionnaire, all items were
measured with 5-point Likert scales, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly
agree.” All scales used in the study are presented in Table 4-1.
In this study, the dependent variable is the respondent’s self-reported intention to
conduct intentional but non-malicious ISP violations. To distinguish it from the malicious
ISP violations, I adopted the work of Willison and Warkentin (2013) to list “not changing
password regularly,” “delayed backup,” and “bring materials back home” as three
specific examples of intentional but not malicious ISP violations for respondents to
accurately evaluate their intention. In particular, the survey emphasized “not malicious”
in each statement. In addition, to avoid the social desirability bias, there was no use of the
“first-person perspective” but “third-person perspective” for each statement to measure
the ISP violating intention.
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Table 4-1
Constructs in the Research Model
General
Concept
Pressure

Construct

Operational Definition

Information
Stressful demands specifically
Security Policy imposed by information security
Stress
policy requirements. A form of
psychological stress caused by
internal or external information
security-related demands taxing
one’s cognitive resources or
abilities.
Rationalization Diffusion of
Attributing personal responsibility
Responsibility to others. The sense of
responsibility towards information
security policies of an organization
to be diminished by divisions of
labor. (Ex: When everyone is
responsible for ISP requirements,
nobody is)
Displacement of Attributing personal responsibility
Responsibility to an authority figure, therefore
accounting employees are not
personally responsible for their
actions regarding ISP’s.
Organizational Distributive
Employee’s viewing ISP
Justice
Justice
procedures as fair by determining
the ratio of one’s input (e.g. time)
to one’s outcome as equal.
Procedural
ISP procedures should be a)
Justice
applied consistently b) free from
bias, c) accurately applied and
used in decision making
Fraud Behavior Intentional ISP An ISP violation is any act by an
(Violation of violation
employee that is against the
Trust)
intention
established ISP of the organization
(e.g. not changing passwords,
delayed backup, unencrypted
USB)

Reference
(D'Arcy et al.
2014; Lazarus and
Folkman 1984)

(Bandura 1990;
Bandura 1999)

(Bandura 1990;
Bandura 1999)

(Adams 1965;
Colquitt et al.
2001)
(Colquitt et al.
2001; Leventhal et
al. 1980)
(D'Arcy et al.
2014; Hu et al.
2011)
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The response options ranged on a fully anchored scale from one to five, in which
five served as ‘strongly agree’ with the statement that the respondent would engage in
actions similar to those of the hypothetical employee in the scenario under circumstances
that represented various levels of the antecedent variables.
For the ISP pressure, I used three items focusing on the general pressure the
respondents perceived in their organization, which are adapted from the work of D’Arcy,
Herath, and Shoss (2014). For two responsibility rationalization, I adapted the scale in
Chong and Wang (2019) in the ISP violation context, and displacement of responsibility
focuses on blaming on supervisor or organization and diffusion of responsibility focuses
on blaming on other employees, each of them respectively measured by three items. To
evaluate two kinds of organizational justice, I required the respondents to report their
perception of the “organization distributive justice” and “organization procedural
justice.” The perceived organization distributive justice aims to evaluate whether the
respondents perceive the advantage of complying with ISP will exceed the convenience
brought by it, measured by three items adapted from the work of Burney et al. (2009).
The perceived organization procedural justice is also measured by three items adapted
from Burney et al. (2009) to evaluate whether the ISP is applied in a fair manner to
everyone in the respondents’ organization.
To control the potential alternative explanation on the hypothesized relationship, I
consider the heterogeneity from the individual level and organizational level. First, I
consider the ISP training (SETA), education, and the ISP self-efficacy of the accountants
as three important individual characteristics to be controlled. In addition, I consider the
organizational size (number of employees within the organization of the respondent) as
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one important organizational characteristic to control. In particular, based on the fraud
triangle theory, the ISP opportunity will be another important factor to influence the ISP
violation intention. Therefore, I also include it as the control variable in this study. In the
questionnaire, all items are measured with 5-point Likert scales, ranging from “strongly
disagree” to “strongly agree.”
Data Collection
I used a market research firm to invite participants to take my survey. External
panelists have been used increasingly in behavioral IS research (Ayyagari et al. 2011;
Bulgurcu et al. 2010) and have certain advantages over traditional methods that are key to
my study. First, panels guarantee respondent anonymity. Therefore, it encourages honest
responses to questions that may normally be subject to social desirability. Second,
external panels contain respondents from a wide range of industries and positions. I
instructed the marketing research firm to collect responses from employed computerusing accountant professionals. Respondents were paid $10 each for participating in the
study. In the questionnaire, the targeted participant was first asked to indicate their
computer experience in the company. If the targeted participant had not used a computer
in the company, that person was excluded from further consideration. The questionnaire
then asked the respondents to measure their perceptions of each research construct.
A total of 574-panel members accepted the invitation to participate in the survey
by viewing the consent agreement and clicking past the first page. After excluding
incomplete responses, I used a data set of 154 responses in all analyses. Table 4-2 shows
additional demographics for these respondents. All employees sampled must use a
computer to complete their daily work tasks.
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Sample demographics reveal that 62 percent were female and tended to be welleducated (73 percent with at least a bachelor’s degree).

Table 4-2
Sample Demographics
Respondents’
Gender

Male
Female
ISO
certification
Yes
No

Percentage Respondents’ Percentage Length of Percentage
education
Employment
at
Organization
42.2%
High school
15.6%
<1 Year
0.6%
57.8%
2 Year Degree
11.0%
1-5 Years
29.2%
48.7%
5-10 Years
31.8%
Percentage 4 Year Degree
41.6%
58.4%

Professional
Degree
Doctorate

23.4%

10-15 Years

11.7%

1.3%

>15 Years

26.6%

Data Analysis and Results
Following the recommendations of Lowry and Gaskin (2014), there are reasons
for me to use Partial Least Squares (PLS) for building and testing my research model.
First, PLS-Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) is a “silver bullet” in my research
situation when models are relatively complex and representative sets of data are rather
small (Ringle et al. 2012). By using PLS estimation, the variance observed in the
dependent variable can be maximized, which conform to my intention to identify the
explanatory power of fraud triangle on the intentional violation behavior and further
compare the relative importance of the three factor of fraud triangle. Therefore, in this
study, I used SmartPLS (version 2.0) as the primary statistical tool to analyze the
measurement and structural models.
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Results of Measurement Model
The measurement model was tested by assessing both the convergent and
discriminant validity. I assessed measurement validity in three ways. First, I assessed
convergent validity, which is how each item was related to its corresponding construct by
examining the factor loadings. Convergent validity is considered satisfactory if the factor
loading of a measure is 0.7 or higher. All factor loadings were above the cutoff point of
0.70 with a t-value higher than 1.96. The measures loaded on their appropriate factors
and there was no evidence of significant cross-loading. Average variance extracted
(AVE) was also examined to evaluate convergent validity. AVE is greater than 0.5,
establishing convergent validity. As presented in Table 4-2, each construct has an AVE
greater than 0.5, suggesting that my measures exhibited adequate convergent validity.
Second, the reliability of the measures was examined through two criteria,
Cronbach’s alpha (C.A.) and composite reliability (C.R.). The CA and C.R. of construct
was greater than 0.7, a common threshold for signifying satisfactory construct reliability.
According to my results, the minimum C.A. and C.R. values exceed the recommended
threshold of 0.7, indicating acceptable reliability of the measures.
Third, discriminant validity is verified by the difference between the AVE of a
construct and its correlation with other constructs. For adequate discriminant validity, the
square roots of AVE of any construct should be greater than the correlations between the
construct and other construct, which means the diagonal elements should be greater than
corresponding off-diagonal ones. (Fornell and Larcker 1981). As presented in Table 4-3,
the criterion for discriminant validity was also met in this study.
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Table 4-3
Descriptive Statistics, Correlations and Reliability
Construct
ISP pressure
Displacement of
Responsibility
Diffusion
Responsibility
Distributive justice

Mean(SD) 1
2
2.35(0.94) 0.875
2.11(0.96) 0.39** 0.890

3

0.29** 0.32**

0.931

3.33(0.88)

0.18*

-0.11

Procedural justice

3.42(0.92)

-0.17*

Intentional ISP violation
intention

2.96(1.00)

0.22**

of 2.26(1.06)

0.16**
0.38**
0.36**

4

5

6

0.891

0.07
**
0.31
0.34** -0.04

0.846
0.891
**
0.42

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; Diagonal elements (in bold) are the square root of the AVE; The offdiagonal elements are the correlations among the constructs;

Common method variance (CMV) may have confounding effects on the observed
relationships between the predictors and criterion variables (Podsakoff et al. 2003).
Although the data was collected in two different phases within a two-week span for
independent and dependent variables, data were all rated by employees, thereby the
potential CMV might not be removed completely. To further assess the potential effects
of common method bias, I conducted Harman’s single factor test and results showed all
of the items of each constructs in my research model cannot be loaded in a single factor
in an EFA. In particular, I found no high correlation between the same marker variables
in time 1 and time 2. The marker variables have low and insignificant correlations with
all the studied constructs, while the partial correlations between the key constructs were
high and significant. Both Harman’s single factor test and marker variables test make me
confident that my data results will not be threatened by the common method bias.
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Results of Structural Model
The structural model for testing the hypotheses is also examined through Smart
PLS 2.0. I followed the steps proposed by Aiken et al. (1991) to examine the moderation
hypotheses. The interaction terms were mean-centered prior to creating the interaction
variables in order to reduce the potential for collinearity (Chin et al. 2003). Bootstrapping
(1000 resamples) was used to determine the significance of the path coefficients. Results
for the structural model are presented in Figure 4-2. The model explains 25% of the
variance of intentional ISP violation intention. As shown in Figure 4-2, the ISP pressure
will significantly improve the displacement of responsibility (β = 0.451, p < 0.05; H1a is
supported), at the same time, the ISP pressure will also result in the diffusion of
responsibility (β = 0.167, p < 0.05; H1b is supported).
Further, the two responsibility rationalizations will both significantly increase the
intentional ISP violation intention (displacement of responsibility: β = 0.186, p < 0.05;
diffusion of responsibility: β = 0.240, p < 0.05). H2a and H2b are both supported.
Finally, the perceived distributive justice will negatively moderate the effectiveness of
ISP pressure on the displacement of responsibility (β = -0.283, p < 0.05). In addition, the
moderating effect of perceived procedural justice on the relationship between ISP
pressure and diffusion of responsibility is also significant (β = -0.338, p < 0.05).
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Displacement of
responsibility

R2=29%
Distributive
justice

-0.283*

0.451*
ISP pressure

Procedural
justice

-0.338*

0.186*
0.015

0.167*
0.240*

Diffusion of
responsibility
R2=26%

Intentional
ISP violation
intention
R2=25%

-0.179*
Control variables:

ISP self-efficacy

Notes: Paths in dash are not significant (p > 0.05). Nonsignificant control variables are not shown. * p <
0.05.

Figure 4-2: Structural Model Results

To further depict the moderating effect of two perceived organization justice
constructs, the PROCESS marco for SPSS was used to make 2-way interaction plots,
which are shown in Figure 4-3. The high and low lines in the interaction plot represent ±1
standard deviations from the mean value of distributive justice and procedural justice.
Only when procedural justice is low (Mean minus one SD) or middle, ISP pressure will
significantly result in diffusion of responsibility (Low: β=0.502, p<0.01, SE=0.09,
LLCI=0.318, and ULCI=0.686; Middle: β=0.172, p<0.01, SE=0.07, LLCI=0.027, and
ULCI=0.317). When there is high procedural justice, the effect of ISP pressure isn’t
significant anymore (High: β=-0.157, p>0.05, SE=0.11, LLCI=-0.384, and ULCI=0.070),
seen in Figure 4-3a. Similarly, for the distributive justice, the results show that, only
when distributive justice is low (Mean minus one S.D.) or middle, ISP pressure will
significantly result in displacement of responsibility (Low: β=0.704, p<0.01, SE=0.11,
LLCI=0.494, and ULCI=0.914; Middle: β=0.442, p<0.01, SE=0.07, LLCI=0.300, and
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ULCI=0.584). When there is high distributive justice, the effect of ISP pressure isn’t
significant anymore (High: β=0.179, p>0.05, SE=0.10, LLCI=-0.017, and ULCI=0.376),
seen in Figure 4-3b.

Figure 4-3a

Figure 4-3b
Figure 4-3. Interaction Diagrams
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Discussion and Contributions for Theory
By connecting the theory of moral disengagement to the rationalization leg of the
fraud triangle, this study uses the responsibility rationalization to provide an explanation
as to how ISP pressure results in the accounting employees’ intentional ISP violations.
Based upon a survey from 154 accounting employees, the results indicated the two types
of responsibility rationalization both significantly increase the intentional ISP violation
intention. Consistent with Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement, when accountants
use displacement of responsibility as well as diffusion of responsibility to rationalize their
actions this will fully mediate the relationship between accounts’ ISP pressure to their
ISP violations. Furthermore, the hypothesized moderating effect of the types of perceived
justice in an organization and the relationship between ISP pressure and rationalizations
are negatively related to the possibility of an intentional ISP violation. That is, as
accountants view their organization to have a sense of “fairness” in their ISP governing
policies it plays an important role in deterring unwanted ISP violation behavior.
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, this study
contributes to the accounting stress literature by adding knowledge of a new type of ISP
stress. Accounting studies on work-related stress have traditionally emphasized the
organizational stressors such as boundary spanning and perceived environmental
uncertainty, overload, role conflict, and role ambiguity (Collins and Killough 1992; Jones
III et al. 2010; Viator 2001) as well as the consequences of those stressors such as job
satisfaction, performance, and turnover intention (Collins 1993; Collins and Killough
1992; Fogarty et al. 2000; Gaertner and Ruhe 1981; Rodell and Judge 2009; Smith et al.
2010). This study examines a unique stress and the resulting consequences faced by
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today’s accountants– ISP requirement and intentional ISP violation behavior, which
extends the sources of pressure influencing accounting employees and confirms current
accounting literature that emphasizes that stress has a general negative effect on
employees’ well-being or performance. Additionally, this study contributes the first
empirical evidence of this new kind of work-related stress (ISP stress) in the accounting
stress literature. This study opens a new research avenue on ISP stress; ISP stress is
becoming a dominant management control issue for accounting information security.
Second, this study contributes to fraud triangle framework by tentatively using the
rationalization element as a coping mechanism to explain how the pressure element (the
ISP pressure in this study) could result in dysfunctional behavior (ISP violations in this
study). Prior studies on fraud triangle application mainly consider the individual
influence or alignment of three elements of fraud triangle on the fraud or other
dysfunctional behavior (Dorminey et al. 2012; Fiolleau et al. 2018), however this study
shows that ISP pressure is a stimulation that could motivate the accounting employees to
conduct responsibility rationalization as a coping mechanism to disengage their moral
responsibility for their intentional ISP violation behaviors. This result expands the
understanding of fraud triangle theory application. Future researchers are encouraged to
conduct more research on the relationship among the three elements of the fraud triangle
with this unique avenue of ISP violations.
Finally, this study contributes to the accounting rationalization literature by
identifying the role of organizational justice on the responsibility rationalization
mechanism choice and effectiveness. Multiple different rationalization mechanisms based
on moral disengagement theory (Bandura 1999) and cognitive dissonance theory
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(Festinger 1962) have been identified (e.g. seven categories of rationalizations of
(Murphy 2012; Murphy and Dacin 2011) and entitlement (Mayhew and Murphy 2014)).
Previous research has proposed that perceptions of organizational justice are
linked with an individual’s rationalization and motivation to commit fraud (Rae et al.
2008). However, there is still a lack of in-depth understanding of how organizational
justice can influence the rationalization process. In this study, I empirically test that not
only will organizational justice climate influence the rationalization of accounting
employees but also a displacement of responsibility will be more related to distributive
justice while procedural justice will provide more explanation of the diffusion of
responsibility. Therefore, I suggest when future studies incorporate rationalization in their
research models, they may need to consider specific types of rationalization mechanisms.
Practical Implications
The results of this study provide important implications for further understanding
the ISP violation phenomenon. First, this study finds supporting evidence that
accountants do need ISP requirements especially with the increasing need of more
technological skills in auditing techniques and accounting information systems for
organizations. However, these ISP requirements should not be set so that they cause more
stress due to security requirements. In such a case, accountants might be likely to
rationalize these ISP violations through moral disengagement techniques, which will
result in organizations that are more vulnerable to violating behavior. Therefore,
accounting managers need to engage in efforts to detect and counter these types of ISP
pressure. Organizations can specifically avoid excessive technical jargon and legal terms
when instructing accountants to follow the ISPs. Accounting managers should carefully
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consider the nature of accountants and their need to work remotely and apply security
policies that will increase accountant’s efficiency and effectiveness. Even if the
accounting profession calls for more technological skills, accounting managers must
include security education training awareness programs to describe the current regulatory
security policy as well as upcoming security changes.
Second, organizations must examine their organizational justice climate towards
security. Accounting employees must view their security policies are fairly and equally
distributed, otherwise they are likely to consider “responsibility” disengagement, which
leads to ISP violation behaviors. Accounting managers can benefit from incorporating
positive, ethical norms into accounting control systems (Merchant and Van der Stede
2007; Noreen 1988). This study highlights the incremental benefit for promoting “fair”
ISPs for organizations. This helps eliminate the moral buffer that accountants may use to
self-justify their misbehavior.
Limitations and Future Research
There are possible limitations to this study. First, this study does not consider
accountants’ individual backgrounds, professional certifications for information systems,
political backgrounds, level within an organization, and cultural differences. These
personal factors might also affect individuals’ risk propensity and capabilities. Future
research should examine the types of role conflict experienced by accounting employees
with all the regulatory security changes in organizations. Second, this study only
examines general ISP violation intentions, and these could change as specific instances
are applied. Therefore, in essence this is a self-reported intention behavior. However,
since respondents were reassured of anonymity and no personally identifiable data were
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collected, I believe these responses are an accurate display of intention. Future research
may examine specific instances of ISP violations that occur in accounting firms that
require more sophisticated technical skills (i.e. security data breaches, malicious insider
behavior). Although this study intentionally chose this route, accounting literature could
benefit from future research of instances that lead to computer fraud or financial
statement manipulations.

Conclusion
When accountants were overwhelmed by ISP requirements it created a new ISP
pressure that resulted in accountants intentionally violating ISPs. In this study, I used the
rationalization element of the fraud triangle as one coping mechanism to ISP pressure.
This coping mechanism allowed accountants to disengage their responsibility when
committing ISP violations. I found that two responsibility rationalizations did mediate the
effect of ISP pressure on the ISP violations. I also identified perceptions of organizational
distributive justice that could effectively reduce the displacement of responsibility while
procedural justice was able to effectively reduce the diffusion of responsibility. My
research findings provide important implications for causes of accounting stress and
expanding on an accountant’s rationalization process. It is evident accounting managers
should carefully consider the balance of benefits of enforcing ISPs to prevent specific IT
threats and the ISP stress risks from overwhelming ISP requirements.
Information security management controls are an important component of an
organization’s internal control structure. Safeguarding and monitoring a company’s
sensitive data are essential aspects of IT controls. Information security management is a
multifaceted task, and part of governing accountants effectively is understanding what
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causes accountants to avoid ISP compliance. The results of this research not only provide
a description of possible motivations for deviation from current ISPs but also suggest
how future research can build on current findings to develop strategies to aid in
implementing ISPS.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This chapter first summarizes the findings of the three essays of this dissertation.
Second, I describe the limitations of the essays. Finally, the chapter concludes with
directions for future research.

Essay 1: Using the Fraud Triangle to Explore Motivations
for Employees’ Copying Company Data
The study finds evidence to explain the possible cause and motivation for why
employees willfully violate the specific ISP of copying company data to bring their work
home. Using the fraud triangle as a broad framework, I examine how the components of
opportunity, rationalization, and pressure will influence an employee and their intention
to copy company data. The findings revealed that this intentional ISP violation is driven
highly by an employee’s desire to complete their assigned workload. Therefore, before
organizations continue to create ISPs, they should examine the overwhelming work
pressure employees may already face with their current workload.
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Essay 2: The Impact of Information Security Policy Controls
on Accounting Employees’ Information Security
Policy Violation Behavior
The accounting profession is known to be a high-pressure job and is subject to
many sources of stress (e.g., work-life balance, dead-lines). Though information security
management controls have the potential to protect organizations from harmful incidents
(e.g., security-related data breaches), ISPs can hinder the productivity of accounting
employees. I examine the levels of organizational ISP controls and how it will reduce the
elements of the fraud triangle in order to prevent intentional ISP violations. The results
revealed ISP controls do indeed reduce opportunities to commit violations, but they also
increase ISP related stress. These findings can lead future research to explore avenues
that may further explain why even with reliable ISP controls, intentional ISP violations
are still occurring within an organization.

Essay 3: Examining Accounting Employees Information
Security Policy Stress and Their Violation Intentions:
Insights from the Coping Perspective
Organizational justice theory expands on the notion that individuals make
business-related decisions whether or not they perceive their environment as fair or
unfair. Building upon this theory, I examine how accounting employees will decide to
violate ISPs if they feel they are not being treated fairly in regard to an organization’s
ISPs. One of the points of the fraud triangle is rationalization. In this study, I expand on
the specific responsibility rationalization aspect an accountant undergoes when
committing ISP violations. These results revealed that accounting managers should
carefully consider balancing the benefits and related costs to enforcing ISPs to prevent
ISP stress risks.

118
Dissertation Limitations
As with all empirical survey investigations, this dissertation is subject to
limitations. First, this study does not consider the accountants’ individual backgrounds,
professional certifications for information systems or security, and level within an
organization. These personal factors and others may affect an individual’s risk
propensity. Second, this study is limited in the type of ISP violations studied. The results
could change as specific instances are applied. Third, this study examines self-reported
intention behavior. Although several precautions were taken to avoid social desirability
bias, this limitation can still be taken into consideration. Finally, this dissertation
conceptualized elements of the fraud triangle with specific construct creation. However,
the items used to measure these constructs may be further defined and expanded (e.g.,
rationalization) in order to capture the entirety of the concept.

Conclusion and Directions for Future Research
Future research will benefit from considering the findings of this dissertation.
First, future studies should look for other characteristics of rationalization. Accounting
employees may undergo different types of cognitive mechanisms when faced with
different types of violation behaviors. For example, the moral disengagement theory
details many other types of cognitive resources individuals may deploy other than
responsibility. Second, ISP violations in my dissertation examined general violations.
Future studies should investigate specific scenarios of both non-malicious and malicious
ISP violations. Third, the consequences faced with an intentional ISP violation behavior
will vary from the consequences of a malicious ISP violation. This deterrent of
consequences can be further examined even when accounting employees are faced with
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high levels of ISP pressure. Lastly, future research can benefit from an expansion of
personal characteristics such as cultural norms within an organization (e.g., tone at the
top) and professional certification (e.g., CISA, CPA) may impact an accounting
employee’s propensity to commit ISP violations.
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Constructs
General Work Pressure

Items
GenPress1: Overall, I often feel
stressful because of their work.
GenPress2: Overall, the work allocated
to me makes me feel stressful.
Rationalization/Idealism Ideal1: People should make certain that
their actions never intentionally harm
another even to a small degree.
Ideal2: One should never
psychologically or physically harm
another person.
Ideal3: If an action could harm an
innocent other, then it should not be
done.
Ideal4: The dignity and welfare of the
people should be the most important
concern in any society.
Opportunity
Opp1: Having other employee's
information systems'
credentials is easy.
Opp3: Having access to other
employees' information systems may
provide competitive edge.
Opp5: In general, there is an
opportunity to exploit the company's
information systems.
Work Completion
1. It is alright to violate certain
Justification
information security policies to get
work done quicker.
2. It is alright to violate certain
information security policies if it helps
you do your job more efficiently.
3. It is alright to violate certain
information security policies when you
are in a hurry and the work needs to get
done

Reference
(Stanton et al.
2001)

(Forsyth 1980)

(Pratt and Cullen
2000)

(D'Arcy et al.
2014)
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Intentional but non
malicious ISP violation
intention

(D'Arcy et al.
Scenario: USB Copy Scenario
Chris is an accounting employee in your 2009)
organization and is currently working
on a report that requires the analysis of
sensitive company financial data. He is
extremely busy and wants to continue
working on the report later that evening
at home. Chris is aware of your
company’s policy that prohibits users
from copying company data to portable
media, such as USB drives, to avoid
security problems. However, Chris
copies several company files to his
personal, unencrypted USB drive so that
he can work on the report at home.
• How likely is it that you would have
done the same as Chris in that situation?
• I could see myself copying the data as
Chris did.
Notes: Data collected from general employees who use a computer for their daily work
tasks.
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Item

Factor
Loading

AVE
(0.50)
0.90

GenPress1

General Work
Pressure
.96

GenPress2

.94

Composite
Reliability
(0.80)
0.95

t-stat.

68.89
55.79

Ideal1

Rationalization/Idealis
m
.82

Ideal2

.88

24.79

Ideal3

.90

28.84

Ideal4

.76

13.50

Opportunity

0.71

0.91
11.78

0.66

0.85

Opp1

.83

23.98

Opp2

.82

17.72

Opp3

.78

12.86

MJ1

Work Completion
Justification
.95

MJ2

.95

81.37

MJ3

.95

62.91

InV1

Intentional ISP
Violation
.98

InV2

.98

0.91

0.97
54.40

0.87

0.95
225.46
179.56
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CORRELATIONS AND SQUARED ROOTS OF AVES
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1.

2.

3.

4.

1. ISP Violation Intent
0.93
2. General Pressure
0.28
0.95
3. Opportunity
0.36
0.18
0.81
4.
-0.24
0.02
-0.17
0.84
Rationalization/Idealis
m
5. Moral justification
0.56
0.20
0.41
-0.33
Notes: Square root AVE is shown on the main diagonal.

5.

0.95
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MEASUREMENT OF THE CONSTRUCTS A
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Constructs
Time point 1:
Perceived ISP
control (Hsu
et al., 2015)

Time point 1:
ISP Stress
(D'Arcy et
al., 2014)

Time point 1:
ISP violation
Opportunity
(Pratt and
Cullen, 2000)
Time point 1:

Measurement
1. Overall, I perceive high extent of organization controls on our
compliance on information security policy (λ = 0.945).
2. Overall, I perceive the organization use all kinds of control
mechanisms to force us follow the information security policy (λ =
0.903).
Composite reliability: 0.921; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.832; AVE:
0.854
Complexity:
1. I often find it difficult to understand my organization’s information
security policies (λ = 0.934).
2. It takes me awhile to understand my organization’s information
security policies and procedures (λ = 0.864).
3. I sometimes do not have time to comply with my organization’s
information security policies (λ = 0.869).
Composite reliability: 0.919; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.868; AVE:
0.792
Overload:
1. I am forced by information security policies and procedures to do
more work than I can handle (λ = 0.865).
2. My organization’s information security policies and procedures
hinder my very tight time schedules (λ = 0.926).
3. I have a higher workload due to increased information security
requirements (λ = 0.912).
4. I am forced to change my work habits to adapt to my organization’s
information security requirements (λ = 0.865).
Composite reliability: 0.940; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.914; AVE:
0.796
Uncertainty:
1. There are constant changes in information security policies and
procedures in my organization (λ = 0.857).
2. There are frequent upgrades to information security procedures in
my organization (λ = 0.842).
3. There are always new information security requirements in my job
(λ = 0.888).
4. There are constant changes in security-related technologies in my
organization (λ = 0.913).
Composite reliability: 0.929; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.899; AVE: 0.766
1. Having other employee's information systems' credentials is easy (λ
= 0.926).
2. Having other employee's information systems' credentials is not
risky (λ = 0.925).
3. In general, there is an opportunity to exploit the company's
information systems (λ = 0.955).
Composite reliability: 0.955; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.929; AVE: 0.876
1. Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how
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Constructs
Idealism
(Forsyth,
1980)

Time point 1:
Work
uncertainty
(Colquitt et
al., 2012)
Time point 1:
ISP selfefficacy
(Compeau
and Higgins,
1995)

Time point 2:
Intentional
ISP violation
intention
(Willison and
Warkentin,
2013)

Measurement
small the risks might be (λ = 0.867).
2. The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong,
irrespective of the benefits gained (λ = 0.877).
3. If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done
(λ = 0.830).
Composite reliability: 0.893; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.823; AVE: 0.736
1. There is a lot of uncertainty at work right now (λ = 0.922).
2. Many things seem unsettled at the organization currently (λ =
0.936).
3. If I think about work, I may feel a lot of uncertainty (λ = 0.914).
4. I cannot predict how things will go at work (λ = 0.784).
Composite reliability: 0.939; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.912; AVE: 0.794
I could complete my job using technology and follow the ISP
requirements if:
1. There was no one around to tell me what to do (λ = 0.793).
2. I had never used a software package like it before (λ = 0.840).
3. I had only the software manuals for reference (λ = 0.920).
Composite reliability: 0.888; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.820; AVE: 0.727
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements.
Someone like you working at a company may feel:
1. All things considered, it is high likely that one might carry out
intentional but not malicious ISP violation (such as not changing
password regularly, delayed backup, bring materials back home et
al.) in the future (λ = 0.891).
2. Depending on situation, the possibility that one will carry out
intentional but not malicous ISP violation (such as not changing
password regularly, delayed backup, bring materials back home et
al.) in the future is high (λ = 0.907).
3. One will often conduct intentional but not malicious ISP violation
(such as not changing password regularly, delayed backup, bring
materials back home et al.) in the future (λ = 0.889).
Composite reliability: 0.924; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.877; AVE:
0.803.
Note: λ is the item factor loadings.
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Table 2
Measurement of the Constructs
Constructs
ISP pressure
(D'Arcy et
al., 2014)

Displacement
of
responsibility
(Chong and
Wang 2019;
D'Arcy et al.
2014))
Diffusion of
responsibility
(Chong and
Wang 2019;
D'Arcy et al.
2014))

Perceived
distributive
justice (Li et
al. 2014;
Sindhav et
al. 2006)
Perceived
Procedural
justice
(Li et al.
2014;
Sindhav et

Measurement
1. Overall, I feel high pressure because of requirements information
security policy (λ = 0.917).
2. Overall, the requirements of information security policy make me
often feel stressful (λ = 0.944).
3. Overall, the requirements of information security policy won’t add
stress to me (λ = 0.771).
Composite reliability: 0.929; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.900; AVE: 0.765
1. Employees cannot be blamed violating information security policies
if they are overloaded with work tasks (λ = 0.919).
2. If management believed all information security policies were all
important, they would have put place better controls (λ = 0.850).
3. Employees cannot be blamed violating certain information security
policies because it is difficult to get the job done otherwise (λ =
0.900).
Composite reliability: 0.920; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.868; AVE: 0.792
1. An employee cannot be blamed for violating certain information
security policies because many factors contribute to this action (λ =
0.929).
2. It is unfair to blame one employee for violating certain information
security policies when many others do the same (λ = 0.933).
3. It is unfair to blame one employee for sharing a password because
he/she has limited responsibility for information security (λ =
0.929).
Composite reliability: 0.951; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.922; AVE: 0.866
1. The increase in the security of my computer and data is worth the
inconvenience or other loss that I may suffer from restricting nonwork-related Internet usage (λ = 0.767).
2. The increase in my productivity is worth the inconvenience or other
loss that I may suffer from restricting nonwork-related Internet
usage (λ = 0.764).
3. The potential improvement in my performance evaluation is likely to
compensate for the inconvenience or other loss that I may suffer
from restricting non-work-related Internet usage (λ = 0.985).
Composite reliability: 0.939; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.912; AVE: 0.794
1. The security procedures for detecting and punishing non-workrelated Internet usage are applied in a fair manner to everyone in my
organization (λ = 0.773).
2. The security procedures for detecting and punishing non-workrelated Internet usage are applied consistently to everyone in my
organization (λ = 0.958).
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Constructs
al. 2006)

Measurement
3. The security procedures for detecting and punishing non-workrelated Internet usage are designed fairly in my organization (λ = 0.924).
Composite reliability: 0.881; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.875; AVE: 0.715
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements.
Someone like you working at a company may feel:
4. All things considered, it is high likely that one might carry out
Intentional
intentional ISP violation (such as (such as not changing password
ISP violation
regularly, delayed backup, bring materials back home et al.)) in the
intention
future (λ = 0.893).
(Willison
5. Depending on situation, the possibility that one will carry out
and
intentional ISP violation (such as not changing password regularly,
Warkentin,
delayed backup, bring materials back home et al.) in the future is
2013)
high (λ = 0.897).
6. One will often conduct intentional ISP violation (such as not
changing password regularly, delayed backup, bring materials back
home et al.) in the future (λ = 0.881).
Composite reliability: 0.920; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.870; AVE: 0.793
Note: λis the item factor loadings.
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Survey Instruments
General Work Pressure Scale (Stanton et al., 2001)
1. Overall, I often feel stressful because of their work.
2. Overall, the work allocated to me makes me feel stressful.
3. Overall, my work won’t stress me out.
Rationalization/Idealism Scale (Forsyth, 1980)
1. People should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm another even to
a small degree.
2. Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks might
be.
3. The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits
gained.
4. One should never psychologically or physically harm another person.
5. One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity and
welfare of another individual.
6. If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done.
7. Deciding whether or not to perform an action by balancing the positive consequences
of the act against the negative consequences is immoral.
8. The dignity and welfare of the people should be the most important concern in any
society.
Information Security Policy Violation Opportunity Scale (Pratt and Cullen, 2000)
1. Having other employee's information systems' credentials is easy.
2. Using other employees' workstations that was unlocked is not difficult.
3. Having other employee's information systems' credentials is not risky.
4. Overcoming company's information systems protection is considered as an unsafe
activity.
5. Having access to other employees' information systems may provide competitive
edge.
6. Having access to other employee's information systems may enhance effectiveness of
the job.
7. In general, there is an opportunity to exploit the company's information systems.
Work Completion Justification Scale (Bandura et al., 1996)
1. It is alright to violate certain information security policies to get work done quicker.
2. It is alright to violate certain information security policies if it helps you do your job
more efficiently.
3. It is alright to violate certain information security policies when you are in a hurry
and the work needs to get done
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Perceived Information Security Policy Control Scale (Hsu et al., 2015)
1. Overall, I perceive high extent of organization controls on our compliance on
information security policy.
2. Overall, I perceive the organization use all kinds of control mechanisms to force us
follow the information security policy.
3. Overall, I feel lack of controls my organization adopt to force us comply with
information security policy.
Information Security Policy General Pressure Scale (D'Arcy et al., 2014)
1. Overall, I feel high pressure because of requirements information security policy.
2. Overall, the requirements of information security policy make me often feel stressful.
3. Overall, the requirements of information security policy won’t add stress to me.
Information Security Policy Stress Scale (D'Arcy et al., 2014)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

1.
2.
3.
4.

1.
2.
3.
4.

A. Complexity
I sometimes feel pressure in my job due to information security requirements.
I find that new employees often know more about information security than I do.
I do not know enough about information security to comply with my
organization’s policies in this area.
I often find it difficult to understand my organization’s information security
policies.
It takes me awhile to understand my organization’s information security policies
and procedures.
I sometimes do not have time to comply with my organization’s information
security policies.
B. Overload
I am forced by information security policies and procedures to do more work than
I can handle.
My organization’s information security policies and procedures hinder my very
tight time schedules
I have a higher workload due to increased information security requirements.
I am forced to change my work habits to adapt to my organization’s information
security requirements.
C. Uncertainty
There are constant changes in information security policies and procedures in my
organization.
There are frequent upgrades to information security procedures in my organization.
There are always new information security requirements in my job.
There are constant changes in security-related technologies in my organization.

Work Uncertainty Scale (Colquitt et al., 2012)
1. There is a lot of uncertainty at work right now.
2. Many things seem unsettled at the organization currently.
3. If I think about work, I may feel a lot of uncertainty.
4. I cannot predict how things will go at work.
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Information Security Policy Self Efficacy Scale (Compeau and Higgins, 1995)
1. I could complete my job using technology if:
2. There was no one around to tell me what to do.
3. I had never used a software package like it before.
4. I had only the software manuals for reference.
5. I had seen someone else using it before trying it myself.
6. I could call someone for help if I got stuck.
7. I had a lot of time to complete the job for which the software was provided.
8. I had just the built-in help facility for assistance.
9. Someone showed me how to do it first.
10. I had used similar software packages like this one before to do my job.
Intentional Information Security Policy Violation Scale (Willison and Warkentin,
2013)
1. All things considered, it is high likely that one might carry out intentional ISP
violation (such as (such as not changing password regularly, delayed backup, bring
materials back home et al.)) in the future.
2. Depending on situation, the possibility that one will carry out intentional ISP
violation (such as not changing password regularly, delayed backup, bring materials
back home et al.) in the future is high.
3. One will often conduct intentional ISP violation (such as not changing password
regularly, delayed backup, bring materials back home et al.) in the future.
Displacement of Responsibility Scale (Chong and Wang, 2019; D'Arcy et al., 2014))
1. Employees cannot be blamed violating information security policies if they are
overloaded with work tasks.
2. If management believed all information security policies were all important, they
would have put place better controls.
3. Employees cannot be blamed violating certain information security policies because it
is difficult to get the job done otherwise.
Diffusion of Responsibility Scale (Chong and Wang, 2019; D'Arcy et al., 2014))
1. An employee cannot be blamed for violating certain information security policies
because many factors contribute to this action.
2. It is unfair to blame one employee for violating certain information security policies
when many others do the same.
3. It is unfair to blame one employee for sharing a password because he/she has limited
responsibility for information security.
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Perceived Distributive Justice Scale (Li et al., 2014; Sindhav et al., 2006)
1. The increase in the security of my computer and data is worth the inconvenience or
other loss that I may suffer from restricting non-work-related Internet usage.
2. The increase in my productivity is worth the inconvenience or other loss that I may
suffer from restricting nonwork-related Internet usage.
3. The potential improvement in my performance evaluation is likely to compensate for
the inconvenience or other loss that I may suffer from restricting non-work-related
Internet usage.
Perceived Procedural Justice Scale (Li et al., 2014; Sindhav et al., 2006)
1. The security procedures for detecting and punishing non-work-related Internet usage
are applied consistently to everyone in my organization.
2. The security procedures for detecting and punishing non-work-related Internet usage
are applied in a fair manner to everyone in my organization.
3. The security procedures for detecting and punishing non-work-related Internet usage
are designed fairly in my organization
Intentional but non-malicious ISP Violation Intention Scale (Scenario USB Copy)
(D'Arcy et al., 2014)
USB Copy Scenario
Chris is an accounting employee in your organization and is currently working on a
report that requires the analysis of sensitive company financial data. He is extremely busy
and wants to continue working on the report later that evening at home. Chris is aware of
your company’s policy that prohibits users from copying company data to portable
media, such
as USB drives, to avoid security problems. However, Chris copies several company files
to his personal, unencrypted USB drive so that he can work on the report at home.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

How likely is it that you would have done the same as Chris in that situation?
I could see myself copying the data as Chris did.
I won’t do the same as Chris in that situation
It is morally unacceptable to do what Chris did in that situation.
It is against my moral belief to do what Chris did in that situation.
Certainty of Punishment Scale
o What is the likelihood that an employee violating information security policies
would be formally punished?
o An employee would be reprimanded at some point for violating information
security policies.
7. Severity of Punishment Scale
o If punished, how severe would the employee’s punishment be?
o An employee would receive harsh sanctions for violating information security
policies.
8. Celerity of Punishment Scale
o If punished, an employee’s punishment would be immediate.
If punished, an employee’s punishment would be timely

